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A WRENCH OR A SLEDGEHAMMER?
FIXING FASITs
Clarissa C. Potter*
HEN the subject is simplifying the tax law, an almost unlimited
number of potential opportunities spring to mind. While sim-
plification can be difficult without making tradeoffs, there is
almost no corner of this massive, messy old edifice that could not be im-
proved if one had the will. The one small corner that attracts my atten-
tion is the relatively new statutory provisions governing asset-backed
financing.1 These statutory provisions create a special purpose vehicle for
accomplishing securitizations: a financial asset securitization investment
trust, or FASIT for short.2
The tax treatment of asset securitization is an obscure topic that most
sensible people, including tax experts, prefer to avoid. Yet securitization
is an important activity in our economy. It is a significant means by which
firms monetize assets such as trade receivables, loans, rents, and pay-
ments on licenses of patents and copyrights. In a securitization, an owner
of cash-flow-producing assets (usually referred to as the originator or
sponsor) transfers those assets to a special purpose entity. The entity is-
sues securities to investors that represent portions of the cash flows from
those assets. The cash produced by the issuance is transferred to the orig-
inator. The terms of the securities are tailored to bear different levels
and types of risk and to satisfy diverse investment objectives. Securitiza-
tion, it is argued, contributes to more liquid capital markets, improved
availability of credit, lower interest rates, and better risk spreading.
Congress has enacted two regimes to provide special tax treatment for
securitization arrangements. As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 3
Congress created the real estate mortgage investment conduit (the
"REMIC"), a special purpose tax entity for securitizing real estate mort-
gage loans.4 By 1996 it had become clear that that a large and growing
volume of securitizations were not accommodated by the REMIC provi-
* Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. The author must disclose that she worked on the FASIT legislation as a congres-
sional staffer and at the Department of the Treasury. She does not, however, feel any
compunction about expressing views inconsistent with the opinions she had or the posi-
tions she took at the time, if she could even remember what they were.
2. I.R.C. §§ 860H-860L (2002).
3. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 671-675, 100 Stat. 2085, 2308-
20.
4. I.R.C. §§ 860A-860G (2002).
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sions. Congress then created the FASIT.5 The FASIT rules were to pro-
vide a regime within the tax code for securitizing credit card receivables,
home equity loans, auto loans and other debt instruments. 6 Although the
FASIT rules could also be used for securitizations of real estate mortgage
loans, Congress left the REMIC rules largely intact.
The REMIC and FASIT legislation responded to problems financial
institutions and others faced in structuring securitizations. In each case,
advocates of the regime argued that the income tax law prevented securi-
tizations from fulfilling their market-enhancing potential.
The REMIC and FASIT rules are not unique. The Internal Revenue
Code contains a number of specific tax regimes that encourage or facili-
tate investment.7 These special rules typically allow entities to escape en-
tity-level tax without being classified as partnerships, and their investors
often get simplified, usually advantageous, tax treatment. These special
regimes include the regulated investment company rules,8 which govern
mutual funds, and the real estate investment trust rules, 9 which govern
investment in real estate.
By some measures, this approach to addressing the tax impediments to
specific transactions can be considered successful. On the other hand,
addressing specific transactions individually creates virtually separate and
highly specialized bodies of tax law, which in turn cause discontinuities
and give rise to complexity. The REMIC and FASIT regimes seem espe-
cially problematic because they represent elaborate statutory structures
created to solve problems faced by a narrow interest group.'0 Nonethe-
less, special purpose entities have reached high levels of acceptance
among users and providers of capital. For example, regulated investment
companies hold large amounts of investment capital and can be credited
with increasing the participation of individuals in the debt and equity
markets by offering diversification for even the smallest investment.'1
Real estate investment trusts make a similar benefit available for real
estate investors.' 2 REMICs play a significant role in the liquidity and
5. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1621, 110 Stat.
1755, 1858-68.
6. See S. REP. No. 104-281, at 126 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1474,1600.
7. The requirements for obtaining the special status include limits on the entity's ac-
tivities, the types of assets it owns, the type of income it earns, the characteristics of the
instruments (debt or equity) it issues, the distributions it makes to investors, and in some
cases the identity of its owners. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 851(b), 856(b) (2002).
8. I.R.C. §§ 851-855, 860 (2002).
9. I.R.C. §§ 856-860 (2002).
10. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, NYSBA Reports on Proposed "FASIT"
Legislation, 94 TAX NOTES TODAY 111-50 (1994) (questioning whether it is appropriate to
add so much complexity when the "legislation . . . will apply principally to a single
industry").
11. As of August 2002, mutual funds had $6.39 trillion under management. Invest-
ment Company Institute, Trends In Mutual Fund Investing (Aug. 2002), available at http://
www.ici.org/facts-figures/trends_0802.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2002).
12. At the end of September 2002, real estate investment trusts had an aggregate mar-
ket capitalization of $163 billion. Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Inv. Trusts, Constituent Com-
panies and Relative Weights in the NAREIT Real-Time Index (Oct. 1, 2002), available at
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depth of the mortgage market by facilitating direct investment pools of
mortgages. 13
The FASIT is a glaring exception to these successes. The regime has
failed miserably to live up to its promise.14 While trillions of dollars of
asset-backed securities are outstanding, few were issued under the FASIT
rules. 15 Instead, financial institutions and other originators of receivables
continue to securitize assets using many of the same techniques relied on
before the enactment of the FASIT provisions. Still, the FASIT provi-
sions lurk in the tax code, occasionally drawing controversy, but largely
ignored. This state of affairs supports arguments in favor of rethinking
the FASIT rules. But what should be done about them? There are sev-
eral choices.
First, the FASIT rules could be left as they are, condemned to dead
wood status. The problem with this approach is that it would essentially
maintain the status quo. So while Congress could be understood to have
abandoned the regime by failing to fix it, the abandonment would be im-
plicit. The continued existence of the statutory provisions could invite
wasteful investments of Internal Revenue Service and Treasury Depart-
ment resources. 16 Moreover, it would continue the risk that taxpayers
http://www.nareit.org/researchandstatistics/indexconstituents.pdf (last visited Oct. 26,
2002).
13. Seven hundred twenty-three billion dollars of mortgage-backed securities were
outstanding at the end of September 2001. Almost all of those securities were interests in
REMICs. The Bond Mkt. Ass'n, An Investor's Guide To Collateralized Mortgage Obliga-
tions, available at http://www.investinginbonds.com/info/igcmo/an-investors-guide-to
cmos.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2002).
14. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, Report on Securitization Reform Measures,
Rep. No. 1024, in NYSBA Recommends Changing FASIT Rules With Eye Toward Repeal,
reprinted in 2003 TAX NOTES TODAY 11-11 (2003) [hereinafter NYSBA Recommends
Changing FASIT Rules].
15. See, e.g., NYSBA Recommends Changing FASIT Rules, supra note 14 ("[I]t is clear
the FASIT rules are not being used to any significant degree .... ); Colman J. Burke et
al., Do the Proposed Regulations Administratively Repeal the FASIT Provisions?, 93 J.
TAX'N 229 (2000) (only a "handful" of transactions); JAMES M. PEASLEE & DAVID Z.
NIRENI3ERG, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF SECURITIZATION TRANSACTIONS 17 (3d ed.
2001) ("To date, the FASIT structure has not been widely used, even by the groups that
sponsored the legislation."); Adam Tempkin, FASIT Structure Loses Market's Interest:
Bond Market Association Points Out Disadvantages for CMBS, ABS, ASSET SALES REP.,
July 10, 2000 ("'The FASIT became effective September 1, 1997, and since then there were
approximately three FASIT deals done.'" (quoting Stephen Whelan, chairman of the cor-
porate department of Thatcher, Proffitt & Wood)).
16. The IRS issued a package of proposed regulations in 2001. Prop. Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.860H-1 to 1.860J-1, 1.860L-1 to 1.860L-4, 65 Fed. Reg. 5807, 5818-9 (Feb. 7, 2000).
The regulations were widely considered a disappointment. See, e.g., Tempkin, supra note
15; IRS Proposal on FASITs Disappoints Supporters of Capital Market, AM. BOND BUYER
2 (Mar. 6, 2000). An IRS semiannual regulatory agenda issued in May 2002 includes a
notation that final regulations will be issued by the end of 2002. IRS, Semiannual Regula-
tory Agenda, 67 Fed. Reg. 33,563, 33,644 (May 13, 2002), reprinted in 2002 TAX NOTES
TODAY 97-58 (2002). The 2002 IRS statement of guidance priorities, however, did not list
the FASIT regulations as on the IRS's agenda. Department of the Treasury, 2002-2003
Priorities for Tax Regulations and Other Administrative Guidance (July 10, 2002), reprinted
in 2002 TAX NOTES TODAY 133-8 (2002). In addition, the current IRS agenda states that
the next action on FASIT regulations is undetermined. IRS, Semiannual Regulatory
Agenda, 67 Fed. Reg. 74,991, 75,097 (Dec. 9, 2002), reprinted in 2002 TAX NOTES TODAY
2003]
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would use the provisions in unanticipated ways.17
Alternatively, the FASIT rules could be repealed entirely. Some, most
notably the Joint Committee on Taxation and the Tax Section of the New
York State Bar Association, have suggested this as a measure to simplify
the tax code.' 8 Repeal of the FASIT rules would make abandonment of
the regime explicit. It would eliminate the risk that the rules could be
used in unanticipated ways or that the IRS or the Treasury Department
would waste limited resources on a regime that is probably unworkable.' 9
It would also reduce the size and complexity of the tax code and the regu-
lations. On the other hand, this approach would constitute an abandon-
ment of the effort to reduce the tax and tax-related transaction costs
associated with securitizations unless other measures were taken.20
Finally, Congress could make substantial changes in the FASIT regime.
The statute charges a substantial toll for the creation of a FASIT and
imposes corporate tax on a portion of FASIT net income. These provi-
sions are the major reasons taxpayers do not utilize the structure. But
more than just making it expensive to use, these taxes communicate a
broader, more fundamental uncertainty about how tradeoffs should be
made between reducing the tax burden on securitizations and the loss of
revenue that might ensue. While the statute permits the IRS to mitigate
239-35 (2002). Unless final regulations are radically different than the proposed regulations
it seems likely they will be met with the same apathy or antipathy as the proposed
regulations.
17. See, e.g., J. COMM. ON TAX'N, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORPORA-
TION AND RELATED ENTIT-Es REGARDINc; FEDERAl. TAX AN1) COM'ENSATION ISSUES,
ANI POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, JCS-3-03, at 242 n.60, 255-60 (Comm. Print 2003), re-
printed in JCT Issues Report on Investigation of Enron's Federal Tax and Compensation
Issues, 2003 TAX NOTES TODAY 31-11 (2003) [hereinafter JCT Report on Investigation of
Enron] (discussing how Enron used a FASIT as a method to avoid certain limits on deduc-
tions of interest paid to foreign persons); IRS Proposal on FASITs Disappoints Supporters
of Capital Market, supra note 16 ("Over the past two and a half years, several companies
have issued FASITs and the IRS has noted several abusive transactions."). This concern
may be mitigated by the broad FASIT anti-abuse regulation that was promulgated in 2000.
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.860L-2, 65 Fed. Reg. 5807, 5819 (Feb. 7, 2002).
18. JCT Report on Investigation of Enron, supra note 17, at 55; NYSBA Recommends
Changing FASIT Rules, supra note 14. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, Report on Sim-
plification of the Internal Revenue Code, Rep. No. 1007, reprinted in NYSBA Tax Section
Sends Tax Simplification Report, 2002 TAX No-r s TODAY 54-48 (2002). See also Letter
from James M. Peaslee & David Z. Nirenberg of Cleary, Gottleib, Steen & Hamilton (New
York) to Mark A. Weinberger, Assistant Treasury Sec'y (Tax Policy), June 6, 2001, re-
printed in It's Time to Bag the FASIT Rules and Start Over, 2001 TAX NOTEs TOAY 117-56
(2001) [hereinafter Peaslee & Nirenberg, It's Time to Bag the FASIT Rules and Start Over].
19. Cf. Peaslee & Nirenberg, It's Time to Bag the FASIT Rules and Start Over, supra
note 18 (considering why FASIT rules are not imminent, "[o]ne explanation may be that
the IRS has concluded (quite reasonably) that writing workable FASIT regulations would
be an enormous undertaking and does not wish at this point to devote the necessary re-
sources to the task ... FASITs would still wither on the vine due to the defects in the
statute").
20. James Peaslee, a leading expert on the tax treatment of securitization and the most
vocal advocate for abandoning the FASIT regime, also has often proposed a number of
alternative, incremental statutory and regulatory changes that he argues would accomplish
as much as improved FASIT rules. See e.g., Peaslee & Nirenberg, It's Time to Bag the
FASIT Rules and Start Over, supra note 18; James M. Peaslee. Peaslee Suggests Alternative
to FASIT Legislation, 1995 TAX NOIEs TODAY 198-100 (1995).
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the effects of some of these provisions through regulations,21 Congress
provided no guidance on how the regulations should resolve the inevita-
ble conflict between complexity and revenue loss: Congress could not re-
solve the conflict itself. With this background, the only way to make
FASITs workable is to confront and deal with the revenue issue.
Recommending that the FASIT provisions remain in the law in their
current state is just not worth the breath. So the question is whether the
provisions should be repealed, leaving taxpayers with the methods they
currently use to securitize non-mortgage debt, or whether fixing the
FASIT regime would be worth the revenue cost. In exploring this ques-
tion, one must ask what securitization contributes, and whether revenue
sacrifices are justified. There are reasonable arguments that securitiza-
tion represents a meaningful improvement over other financing tech-
niques by reducing inefficiencies. Even if securitization does not have
unique benefits, it is at least comparable to other transactions that are
subject to more favorable tax rules. As a policy matter, this leads me to
be weakly in favor of making legislative changes to better accommodate
securitization transactions. But if revenue cannot be devoted to this pro-
ject, then the FASIT legislation should be jettisoned.
This article will first provide a brief introduction to non-tax aspects of
securitization transactions. The second part will describe the arguments
about whether securitization is an efficiency-enhancing activity that
should be encouraged, or at least not discouraged, by the tax law. I will
shift in the third section to a description of the general tax rules other
than the FASIT provisions that apply to securitizations. Rather than pro-
viding a full and detailed analysis, this section is intended to establish a
context for the FASIT regime and to give the reader a sense of the ways
securitizations can be accomplished without resort to that regime. Fi-
nally, I will discuss FASITs, the rules that impede their use, why such a
flawed law was enacted, and what can be done about it now.
I. SECURITIZATION IN BRIEF
The term "securitization" describes a large category of transactions. It
is a strategy whereby assets representing rights to cash flows are pooled
and monetized. The originator of assets22 can securitize them by transfer-
ring them to a special purpose vehicle ("SPV"), often a trust, which issues
marketable securities. The securities entitle investors to some portion of
the cash flows from the assets.23 The proceeds from the issuance of the
securities are used to reimburse the originator for the assets. In some
cases this transaction is a sale of the assets, and others it is a borrowing
secured by the assets. At times the originator intends to characterize the
21. I.R.C. § 8601(c) (2002).
22. For purposes of this paper, I will refer to the firm that arranges the securitization
and transfers the assets as the originator, although at times this firm will have acquired,
rather than originated, the assets. This firm is also frequently referred to as the sponsor.
23. These interests are often called asset-backed securities.
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transaction differently for different legal and non-legal purposes.24
The types of assets that are securitized include real estate mortgage
loans, credit card receivables, auto loans, other consumer debt, home eq-
uity loans, and commercial mortgages. 25 Rental payments, royalties, and
franchise fees are also securitized. One extreme example of a securitiza-
tion is the infamous Bowie Bonds, which securitized the royalties from
rock star David Bowie's recordings. 26
The cash flows from the securitized assets are generally collected on
behalf of the SPV and then used to make payments on the securities.
Payments to the investors are closely linked to the cash flows from the
securitized assets, and the aggregate payments on the securities usually
represent a large portion of the cash flows. But most securitization ar-
rangements provide that payments must be made on securities even if the
SPV does not receive the corresponding payments on the assets.
Payments on the securities can be assured through several different
techniques. The aggregation of large numbers of similar debt instruments,
receivables or other assets in the SPV diversifies risk and makes default
rates highly predictable. 27 Cash flows from excess assets held by the SPV
usually cover the predicted defaults and delinquencies. This is referred to
as overcollateralization. 28 Overcollateralization is but one type of credit
support utilized in securitizations. Others include reserve funds created
with excess cash flow from the pooled assets and letters of credit, irrevo-
cable lines of credit, or guarantees from banks or other institutions that
have high credit ratings. 29
The SPV can issue securities representing an interest in the pool of
assets in a number of different forms. They are often divided into classes
having different risk, duration, and payment characteristics. 3 ° In the sim-
plest structure the SPV issues securities that represent pro-rata interests
in the pool's cash flows. A slightly more complex structure is one that
accomplishes the equivalent of coupon stripping-the securities provide
for payments that are measured by a particular payment or payments on
24. Usually, as discussed below, it is desirable for the securitization transaction to be
treated as a sale to an unrelated entity for bankruptcy, accounting, and regulatory capital
purposes. See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. A transaction may be more ad-
vantageously treated for tax purposes either as a sale or as a secured borrowing depending
on the particular circumstances of the originator, the assets, the investors, and the overall
transaction.
25. See Randall D. Luke & Louis F. Burke, United States, in SECURITIZATION 205
(David G. Glennie et al. eds., 1998).
26. See Aaron Elstein, If It Moves, David Pullman Might Securitize It, AM. BANKER,
Feb. 28, 1997, at 7. According to a recent article, these investments "underperformed."
Heather Timmons, Everybody Out of the Risk Pool?, Bus. WK., Sept. 2, 2002, at 86, 87.
27. See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUC'URED FINANCE: A GUIDE 'ro THE PRINCIPLES
OF ASSET SECURITIZATION § 2:1 at 2-1 (Adam D. Ford ed., 3d ed. 2002).
28. See, e.g. Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Tax'n, Comm. on Fin. Transactions, Subcomm.
on Asset Securitization, Legislative Proposal to Expand REMIC Provisions of the Code to
Include Nonmortgage Assets, 46 TAX L. REV. 299, 331 (1991) [hereinafter Proposal to Ex-
pand REMIC Provisions].
29. SCHWARCZ, supra note 27, § 2:3 at 2-15; Luke & Burke, supra note 25, at 209.
30. Proposal to Expand the REMIC Provisions, supra note 28, at 3 10.
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the underlying assets. Conversely, a class of securities may provide for
payments that are seemingly unrelated to the cash-flow on the underlying
assets. 31 An SPV's securities often have allocations of default or delin-
quency risks, "prepayment risks," or interest rate risks that vary by
class.32 Naturally, the class that bears the most risk also provides the
highest yield.
There are several other almost universal elements of securitization
transactions. First, the pool of securitized assets is usually held by an en-
tity that is legally separate from the originator, and the assets are trans-
ferred in a way that qualifies as a "true sale."'33 This makes the assets
inaccessible to the originator's creditors in most cases. Second, the trans-
action must protect the SPV against being placed in bankruptcy, whether
voluntarily, involuntarily, or upon bankruptcy of the transferor, and
against government claims.34 An SPV that has these two characteristics is
often referred to as being "bankruptcy remote." This allows the SPV and
its assets to be isolated from the risks undertaken by the originator in its
business, and offers investors a risk profile different from investments in
debt issued directly by the originator, even when that debt is secured by
the assets similar to those in the pool.35 These measures often permit the
31. An example of this is synthetic floating rate securities issued by an SPV that holds
fixed rate debt. The securities provide for payments equal to the principal amount of the
debt. They also provide for payments based on an interest rate set by a reference interest
rate index, capped at the fixed rate on the debt. The SPV issues another class of securities
that entitle the holders to payments determined by the difference between the interest rate
determined under the reference interest rate index and the fixed rate on the debt. Thus, in
the aggregate the securities provide for payments equal to the cash flow on the securitized
assets. See PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 207-08.
32. SPVs often issue subordinated interests. The holders of the subordinated securi-
ties receive their payments only after the senior security holders are paid. If the structure
includes subordinated securities, excess cash will be allocated to make up delayed pay-
ments on the interests before amounts are paid to the originator. In absorbing such losses
the subordinated investors can further insulate the more senior holders from unexpected
defaults on the underlying assets. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 27, § 2:4 at 2-17 to 2-18; Sunil
Gangwani, Securitization 101, in 3 SPEAKING OF SECURITIZATION 4-1, 5 (1998), available at
http://www.securitization.net/pdf/seclO.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2002).
33. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 27, § 3:2.2 at 3-14.
34. Those structuring securitization transactions control these risks using a number of
techniques. The SPV's charter or governing documents can limit the circumstances in
which the entity can file a bankruptcy petition. Ensuring the SPV is not owned or con-
trolled directly by the originator also reduces bankruptcy risk. See SCHWARCZ, supra note
27, § 3:2.2 at 3-14. Originators often accomplish this by selling assets to a wholly owned
subsidiary that engages in no business other than participating in the securitization. The
subsidiary then transfers the assets to the SPV. This two-tiered structure is referred to as
the FINCO structure. Id. § 3:2.2 at 3-14. It is used to manage the conflict between the
need for a true sale and the need to provide recourse through overcollateralization or
other means. This structure also allows gain (or loss) on the sale of the assets to the subsid-
iary to go unrecognized if the subsidiary is a disregarded entity for tax purposes. If the
subsidiary is a corporation for tax purposes, the gain (or loss) on the sale can be deferred
under the consolidated return rules. Treas. Reg. .§ 1.1502-13 (as amended in 2000).
SCHWARCZ, supra note 27, § 3:2.2 at 3-14; see also PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 15,
at 63-66, 891-99.
35. Commentators often cite the benefit of bankruptcy remoteness for originators
having below investment grade credit ratings. The securities issued by a special purpose
entity can easily have a higher credit rating, and therefore lower cost of capital, than the
2003]
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securities issued in the securitization to have a higher credit rating, and
thus bear lower interest rates, than debt issued directly by the origina-
tor.36 They also may allow the originator to account for the transfer of the
SPV's assets as a sale to an unconsolidated entity under generally ac-
cepted accounting principals. 37 This can eliminate the assets and the off-
setting obligations represented by the securities from the originator's
balance sheet, and can allow the originator to recognize financial state-
ment income on the transfer. 38
Illustration: A simple illustration of a securitization follows.
A bank originates 100 unsecured loans with similar terms and a re-
maining term of 10 years to maturity. The loans have slightly different
interest rates and remaining durations, but their rates and remaining
durations do not diverge greatly, and their weighted average interest rate
is 10%. The aggregate principal amount of the loans is $5,000,000. They
are pooled and transferred to a trust, along with an amount to fund a
reserve account. The trust holds the loans for the benefit of 90 certificate
holders, each entitled to receive a payment of $50,000 of principal and
interest thereon at a market rate of interest (assume for this purpose
9.5%), determined by the weighted average rate of interest on the loans
held in the pool, minus a servicing fee. Each certificate holder is entitled
to the equivalent of 1/100 of each payment of principal and interest less a
discount on each loan held in the pool.
The ownership of the remaining $50,000 of principal, and the interest
thereon, is represented by a subordinated interest in the pool. This inter-
est is held by an investor other than the bank. Payments on subordinated
interests generally cannot be made unless the reserve account is fully
originator. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, I STAN. J.L. Bus. &
FIN. 133, 137 (1994); Gangwani, supra note 32, at 3.
36. Schwarcz, supra note 35, at 136-38; Gangwani, supra note 32, at 3.
37. Certain other factors also come into play. See Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.,
Summary of Statement No. 125: Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets
and Extinguishments of Liabilities (June 1996) ("FAS 125"), available at http://
www.fasb.org (last visited Oct. 26, 2002); Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Summary of
Statement No. 140: Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extin-
guishments of Liabilities - a Replacement of Statement 125 (Sept. 2000) ("FAS 140"), avail-
able at http://www.fasb.org (last visited Oct. 26, 2002). For a brief discussion of the rules
that allow the originator to treat a securitization as a sale, see PEASLEE & NIRENI3ERG,
supra note 15, at 64-68. For a more detailed discussion of the rules, see SCiHWiARTZ, supra
note 27, ch. 7. The Financial Accounting Standards Board has made significant changes to
the statements in the wake of the Enron scandal, where transactions with special purpose
entities governed (at least according to Enron and Arthur Anderson) by FAS 125 and 140
played a major role. See Fin. Accoutning Standards Bd., Interpretation No. 46: Consolida-
tion of Certain Special-Purpose Entities, and Interpretation of ARB NO. 51 (Jan. 2001),
available at http://www.fasb.org (last visited Jan. 27, 2003). It is unclear to what extent
these rules will affect the securitizations that are the focus of the piece. See also Mitchell
Pacelle, Enron Report Provides Details of Deals that Masked Debt, WALL ST. J.. Sept. 23,
2002, at A6; FASB Proposal Would Require Consolidating Many Special Purpose Entities
With "Parent" Business Enterprises, 16 J. TAX'N OF FIN. INSTS. 4850 (2002).
38. Similar, but slightly different factors allow a regulated entity, such as a bank or a
securities dealer, to exclude the assets from their net capital subject to regulatory capital
requirements. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 27, § 1.2 at 1-7; Michael S. Gambro & Scott
Leichtner, Selected Legal Issues Affecting Securitization, I N.C. BANKING INST. 131 (1997).
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funded and all payments to the other certificate, holders are up to date.
The certificate holders and the subordinated interest holder pay, in the
aggregate, $5,000,000 for the interests, and that money is transferred to
the bank in exchange for the loans.
The bank will continue to service the loans, collecting interest and prin-
cipal, and otherwise dealing with the borrowers, including making at-
tempts to collect if there is a default. This makes the pooling of the loans
in the trust essentially transparent to the borrowers. The bank subtracts
from the collections of interest some portion as its fee, placing the re-
mainder in an account to be disbursed to the holders of the SPV's securi-
ties or the reserve account.
The trust may also obtain a guarantee of timely payment or a letter of
credit from a bank or other financial institution with a high credit rating.
There are various mechanisms for paying credit support fees, but the fees
are often charged as a percentage of the interest collections on the under-
lying loans.
II. THE BENEFITS OF SECURITIZATION
In this section I will discuss why firms securitize assets and what bene-
fits commentators attribute to securitization. In considering whether the
FASIT provisions should be extended or abandoned, one should compare
the economic effects of securitization and other types of funding mecha-
nisms. A review of the literature reveals that the claims about the advan-
tages of securitization tend to be echoed repeatedly without critical
examination. Nonetheless, securitization does appear to be an evolution-
ary step in corporate finance, and the qualities attributed to securitiza-
tions cannot be totally discounted. Moreover, it does not appear the
securitization movement is driven by income tax considerations.
The proponents of the FASIT legislation explained the need for the
legislation by extolling the important benefits that increased securitiza-
tion provides. For example, when Representative Clay Shaw introduced
FASIT legislation in 1995, he said that simplifying the tax treatment of
securitizations would make credit easier to obtain and less expensive for
borrowers, especially small and medium-sized businesses, and would in-
crease the safety and soundness of the U.S. banking system. 39 Professor
Steven Schwarcz, one of the leading advocates of securitization, says the
transaction has "unique benefits,' 40 and the claim is frequently repeated.
But the unique benefits of securitization are hard to pin down. Most
descriptions of the benefits are based on a narrow conception of costs
incurred by the firm engaging in the transaction. Broader statements
about the economic benefits of securitization as a financial trend tend to
be conclusory or superficial. More thorough inquiries into the question
39. 141 CONG. REC. E1369-70 (extended ed. June 29, 1995) (Extended Statement of
Rep. Shaw on Introduction of Securitization Enhancement Act), LEXIS 141 CONG. REC.
E1369 p* t3 6 9- 7 0 .
40. Schwarcz, supra note 35, at 133.
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are largely theoretical. There appears to be little empirical evidence to
support the many benefits attributed to securitization.
Observers give a number of explanations for the existence of securi-
tization transactions. In general, one can say that the transactions occur
because the pooling of assets in a securitization provides diversification.
If individual loans of the type securitized were sold to investors the loans
would be highly discounted for the risk associated with the volatility of a
single loan. While the behavior of any particular borrower is hard to pre-
dict, if large numbers of similar loans are combined into a pool, risk is
reduced because it becomes possible to statistically predict rates of de-
fault and other behaviors with accuracy.41
In addition, pooling can allow the returns on the assets to be segre-
gated into different kinds of investments with different risk characteris-
tics. This allows investors to tailor their risk exposures. For example, the
critical feature of the REMIC provisions is that it allows SPVs holding
real estate mortgage loans to issue fast-pay and slow-pay classes of securi-
ties. The fast-pay class absorbs prepayments of principal on the underly-
ing mortgage loans, and so may mature sooner than it would if payments
on the loans were made according to schedule. The slow-pay class, which
appeals to investors who are sensitive to reinvestment risk, receives only
scheduled payments of principal until the fast-pay class matures.42 Be-
cause payment rates on real estate mortgage loans can be very sensitive
to changes in market interest rates, the fast-pay, slow-pay structure allows
investors to take different positions on interest rates.
These considerations would explain why an investor would prefer to
invest in a pool of loans rather than in a single loan, but they do not show
that securitization's benefits are unique. They do not explain why securi-
ties issued by an SPV would or should be preferred over debt issued by a
diversified corporation, particularly if that debt is secured by similar as-
sets. The pooling that occurs through a securitization need not be per-
formed by a specially created trust. Any entity with sufficient resources
can accomplish the same thing. Thus, a corporation that holds many loan
assets reduces its risk through diversification. That corporation can (in
theory) issue debt instruments with the same terms as securities issued in
a securitization.
The significant feature of securitization is that it insulates investors
from changes in the originator's financial status.43 Securities issued in a
securitization transaction can obtain credit ratings that are higher than
the alternative debt securities issued by the originator. For this reason,
securitization is often said to reduce the cost of funds to a firm.44 A simi-
lar, but often separately articulated benefit is access to funds from inves-
41. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 27, § 2:1 at 2-1 to 2-2.
42. See Gangwani, supra note 32, at 3; Proposal to Expand REMIC Provisions, supra
note 28, at 330.
43. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 35, at 137 ("Even an originator with an investment
grade rating may derive benefit from securitization if the SPV can issue debt securities with
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tors who would not invest in securities issued directly by the originator.45
Indirect benefits to originators are also cited in favor of securitizations.
The benefit most commonly noted is the off-balance sheet financing
which securitizations allow.46 Thus, securitization transactions raise
funds in much the same way as borrowing, and yet do not increase the
originator's debt-to-equity ratio.47 Some cite the utility of securitizations
in allowing originators to avoid violating restrictive debt covenants. 48
Other benefits include improved ability to meet minimum capital rules,
increased fee income (substituted for interest on assets), less expensive
management of asset and liability risk, and less expensive credit
enhancement.49
The problem with stating the benefits of securitization this way is that it
focuses the issue too narrowly. The question is whether these savings
identified with securitization reflect an absolute reduction in a firm's cost
of capital, or whether the savings are offset elsewhere. The evidence on
this is muddy.50
There is an argument that the cost-of-capital savings generated by
securitizations are not absolute, but represent a mere shifting. Here the
debate about the economic effect of secured financing is instructive.
Some observers argue the savings on capital costs obtained through se-
cured borrowing come at the expense of other stakeholders. In theory,
secured debt should reduce the cost of borrowing because it reduces the
risk that insolvency or bankruptcy will prevent repayment. But some be-
lieve that secured borrowing reduces the cost of new debt at the expense
of the issuer's unsecured creditors. 51 When a firm pledges security it
a higher investment grade rating and, as a result, significantly decrease the originator's
interest costs."); Gambro & Leichtner, supra note 38, at 131.
45. Gambro & Leichtner, supra note 38, at 132; Schwarcz, supra note 35, at 143. Rea-
sons for this, other than differences in credit rating, include internal policies that limit
investors' position in any single issuer.
46. See, e.g., J. COMM. ON TAX'N, 104TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 104TH CONGRESS, JCS-12-96, at 258-59 (Comm. Print 1996)
[hereinafter 1996 Blue Book].
47. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 35, at 142-43. But see Minh Van Ngo, Agency Costs
and the Demand and Supply of Secured Debt and Asset Securitization, 19 YALE J. ON REG.
413, 463 & n.111 (2002) (suggesting that perceived benefits from off-balance sheet account-
ing and the effects of sale treatment on covenants may be transitional if these accounting
principles come to be viewed as distortive). This prediction seems plausible in light of the
role off-balance sheet transactions had in the downfall of Enron. See, e.g., Pacelle, supra
note 37.
48. Gambro & Leichtner, supra note 38, at 132.
49. Id. at 131-33 ; Schwarcz, supra note 35, at 141-45; Luke & Burke, supra note 25, at
209-20.
50. In all his advocacy for securitization, Schwarcz cites only two empirical studies of
its effects on capital costs. See Schwarcz, supra note 35, at 134 & n.5. In later work he says
there is no empirical evidence that securitization is anything more than a "zero sum game."
SCHWARCZ, supra note 27, at A-1.
51. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 27, at A-1 to A-5 & nn.1-4; Paul M. Shupack, Bounda-
ries and Definitions: A Commentary on Dean Baird, 80 VA. L. REV. 2273 (1994); Chase W.
Ashley, Comment, When a Company Securitizes, Its Creditors Face Higher Risks, AM.
BANKER, May 7, 1993, at 4. Professor Schwarcz argues that since in a securitization assets
are replaced with cash it is wrong to say that assets are removed from the corporation and
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reduces the assets from which other debts can be repaid. This is detri-
mental to the position of preexisting unsecured creditors.5 2 If unsecured
creditors can adjust interest rates to offset this detriment, the benefit of
lower interest costs from the secured debt is reduced or eliminated. Al-
ternatively, secured debt might produce cost savings by externalizing
costs onto the firm's involuntary creditors53 that have no ability to adjust
interest rates.54 If this occurs, the lower rates obtained through secured
borrowing provide no net economic benefit even when they provide a
lower net cost of capital.
This argument may be extended to securitizations. Securitizations re-
semble more conventional secured debt in many ways.55 The problem is
that observed behavior does not seem to support the analogy, so even if
these theories about secured debt are true, they may not hold for securi-
tizations. Firms reportedly avoid issuing secured debt if possible, 56 and
enjoy no significant interest rate advantage (if they are financially
healthy) when they borrow on a secured basis. 57 In contrast, the cost of
funds obtained through securitization can be lower than the costs associ-
ated with direct borrowing, whether secured or unsecured, because of the
better credit rating associated with a securitization. 58 Moreover, securi-
tizations have increased dramatically over the past decade. 59 According
no longer available to satisfy the claims of unsecured creditors. SCHWARCZ, supra note 27,
at A-2. Here there may be some difference between secured debt and securitization. Se-
cured debt has a separate claim on assets, but to the extent those assets are insufficient it
may also have recourse to the firm's other assets, thus diluting the claims of the unsecured
creditors. A securitization seems different because the holders of the SPV's securities do
not have recourse against the originator. However, overcollateralization may create a sim-
ilar effect because it replaces assets held by the firm with less cash than those assets are, in
some sense, worth. For a general discussion on the literature and analysis of evidence, see
Claire A. Hill, Is Secured Debt Efficient?, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1117 (2002).
52. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 27, at A-I. Professor Schwarcz calls this the principle
of exposure conservation. Id. at A-4 & n.8 (citing Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle
of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1054 (1984)).
53. Tort plaintiffs and government entities are examples of involuntary creditors.
These creditors have no ability to adjust interest rates.
54. See Lynn LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 45-46 (1998).
55. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, supra note 51, at 1129 ("A securitization transaction is a
complex version of a pledge of receivables."). See also Ngo, supra note 47, at 459.
56. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bank-
ruptcy; 47 DUKE L.J. 425, 446-48 (1997).
57. Id. at 448. This may only be true for firms in reasonably good financial health.
Riskier firms experience a bigger bonus from issuing secured debt. See Hill, supra note 51,
at 1155-58.
58. Ngo, supra note 47, at 460; Schwarcz, supra note 56, at 446.
59. The amount of outstanding securities backed by credit card receivables and auto,
home equity, and manufactured housing loans has grown rapidly over the last eight years,
from $316 billion in 1.995 to $1.421 trillion at the end of the second quarter of 2002. The
Bond Market Association, Asset Backed Securities Outstanding, available at http://
www.bondmarkets.com/Research/absos.shtml (last visited Oct. 26, 2002). In the first half
of 2002, $237.9 billion of these securities were issued, up 6.2 percent from the $223.9 billion
issued during the same period in the prior year. Corporate issuances during the same pe-
riod, by comparison, fell by 25.6 percent, and this drop occurred in all corporate sectors.
The Bond Market Association, Res. Q. 5-6 (Aug. 2002), available at http://
bondmarket.com/Research/ResQtly-802.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2002). For more com-
plete, but perhaps dated evidence of the difference in rates of securitization versus secured
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to Professor Schwarcz, the tremendous rate of increase in outstanding
securitizations relative to other forms of corporate borrowing is evidence
that firms prefer securitization to other methods of raising capital.60 This
suggests, at a minimum, that the theory of cost shifting as applied to
securitization is flawed. Nonetheless, one might be tempted to argue that
the lower capital costs associated with securitization are simply evidence
that it is a more effective cost shifting technique than secured borrowing.
The most plausible argument that securitization produces net economic
benefit is that it has lower agency costs relative to other forms of financ-
ing. If secured borrowing represents a method of reducing agency costs,
then securitization may simply be a better mousetrap. Different mecha-
nisms by which creditors seek to control the risk of borrower insolvency
may make securitizations less costly. Professor Claire Hill argues that
securitization reduces the informational costs associated with raising capi-
tal. Firms may use securitization to take advantage of economies of scale
by developing more standardized receivables and acquiring specialized
ways of disseminating information about the receivables and the securi-
ties they back. In addition, Professor Hill says, securitization may en-
hance specialization, allowing originators to transfer risk to firms better
situated to bear it, and to concentrate on originating and servicing receiv-
ables. This specialization should reduce costs and increase efficiencies. 6 1
Securitization reduces the costs of monitoring and does not impose the
restrictive debt covenants associated with secured borrowing. 62 In addi-
tion, the costs incurred by secured creditors upon debtor insolvency are
likely higher than those suffered by holders of asset-backed securities on
the insolvency of the originator.63 These cost differences may aggregate
to make securitization an evolutionary improvement over secured debt,
and may help explain a preference for financing through securitization
over other forms of borrowing.
borrowing, see LoPucki, supra note 54, at 24, and James J. White, Corporate Judgment
Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki's the Death of Liability, 107 YAI E L.J. 1363, 1377-
80 (1998).
60. Ngo, supra note 47, at 459 (stating that "securitization is the fastest-growing form
of capital asset formation in the United States," and is growing world-wide) (citing
Schwarcz, supra note 35, at 133).
61. See Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1061, 1086-100 (1996); Ngo, supra note 47, at 462.
62. Ngo, supra note 47, at 462-63. Ngo argues that costly debt covenants have little
benefit in reducing the likelihood of creditor insolvency for financially sound firms, and
that securitization is a much better strategy for ensuring repayment than collateralization.
Id. at 452. The very structure of securitization operates to radically reduce the cost of
monitoring the borrower and the collateral. Id. at 462. See also SCHWARCZ, supra note 27,
at A-7 (citing Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priori-
ties Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979)).
63. Ngo, supra note 47, at 462. Secured creditors must participate in a debtor's bank-
ruptcy to collect on their claims. Holders of asset-backed securities might be drawn into
the originator's bankruptcy proceedings, but do not necessarily have to participate to pro-
tect their claims on the assets that collateralize their interests. Thus, the expected costs of a
debtor bankruptcy to a secured creditor are likely to be higher than those of an originator
bankruptcy to an asset-backed security holder.
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Securitizations also may entail unique costs, but the comparatively
higher interest rates imposed on firms that raise capital through secured
borrowing "strongly indicate that ... the unique costs to creditors associ-
ated with secured loans are greater than the unique costs" to originators
of securitized assets. 64 These reduced costs do not entail a greater claim
over a firm's assets than made by secured creditors, so the lower interest
rates that originators obtain in securitizations (relative to secured bor-
rowing) should not be offset by higher rates demanded by unsecured
creditors or increased costs imposed on involuntary creditors.
Additional claims are made about the benefits of securitization, includ-
ing that securitization creates informational efficiencies. 65 Other claims
include that asset-backed securities can be designed to satisfy previously
unmet investor demands, 66 and that they make it possible for otherwise
illiquid assets (such as consumer credit) to be traded in broader and more
efficient markets. This would reduce the costs of financing these assets,
and consequently reduce interest rates and increase access to credit for
consumers.
After reviewing these arguments it is hard to be certain that asset
securitization represents an improvement in financial technology that
should be fostered by tax rules. It does, however, seem that taxes do not
play a principal role in explaining why corporations increasingly utilize
securitization to raise capital even if tax considerations play an important
role in how securitization transactions are structured. Moreover, none of
the arguments about the economic function of asset securitizations sup-
port the position that securitizations should be treated significantly worse
under tax rules than economically comparable transactions, or that it
would be wise to purposefully impede securitizations through the tax
system.
Ii. GENERAL FEDERAL INCOME TAX APPROACH
TO SECURITIZATIONS
Although securitizations share many of the same general characteris-
tics, small differences have large implications for tax purposes and result
in a number of different approaches to their treatment under the income
tax laws. But a single consideration dominates: securitizations are usually
structured to avoid an additional layer of tax at the SPV level. Significant
tax imposed on the SPV is generally thought to make securitization trans-
64. Id. at 463.
65. Professor Schwarcz argues that the ability of a securitization to allocate credit risk
differently among different classes of interests helps reduce costs of asymmetric informa-
tion among creditors, thus resulting in a lower blended rate of interest. SCHWARCZ, supra
note 27, at A-9 & n.17. See also Hill, supra note 61, at 1086-100.
66. "[S]ecuritization provides efficient functional segmentation in that it allocates the
risks and tasks associated with financial intermediation to the parties who can most
cheaply and effectively bear those risks and perform those tasks." Proposal to Expand
REMIC Provisions, supra note 28, at 311.
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actions uneconomic. 67 The principal dilemma is that while the originator
wishes to avoid consolidation with the SPV for accounting and other pur-
poses, this also makes consolidation for tax purposes difficult. 68 The sec-
ondary problem is that the originator wants to securitize "efficiently," i.e.,
produce as much current cash as possible from the assets, but this may
expose the SPV to entity-level tax. The tension between these objectives
drives the search for better ways to securitize and is behind the effort to
create statutory regimes that relieve the stress.
The following discussion is intended to provide an overview of the tax
treatment of securitizations so that the reader can better understand the
context of the FASIT rules. 69 Rather than giving a full analysis of the
legal basis for the tax characterization of various securitization transac-
tions, or even a full description of the transactions, this section is in-
tended to give an overview of the general categories of securitization
transactions and sketch the different effects each transaction has on the
income tax treatment of their participants. To that extent I have taken
some liberties to simplify the discussion and have not described many of
the variations that occur in securitizations.
There have been a number of significant changes in both the tax law
and other rules that apply to securitization transactions since the FASIT
provisions were enacted. It is not my purpose to explore these changes in
detail. Instead I wish to alert the reader to the changes to provide per-
spective on the changed environment for FASITs. The first part of this
section discusses securitization transactions that are not subject to a statu-
tory regime. The end of the section discusses the REMIC vehicle.
In general, non-REMIC securitization transactions fall into two catego-
ries for tax purposes: transactions where a separate entity is created to
hold the securitized assets and to issue equity and debt, and transactions
in which no entity separate from the originator is intended to be created.
In the former structure, the SPV is usually intended to qualify as a gran-
tor trust or partnership and therefore not as an entity subject to tax on its
income. The transfer of assets to the SPV is a contribution or sale for tax
purposes, and securities represent either undivided ownership interests in
the securitized assets or partnership interests. Thus, income passes
through to the holders of the securities and is not taxed at the SPV
67. See PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 12; Proposal to Expand REMIC
Provisions, supra note 28, at 312 & n.43. This makes sense when one considers that the
most obvious alternative to a securitization transaction is a secured borrowing by the origi-
nator. Although securitization transactions are said to significantly reduce costs of capital,
no one argues they reduce the costs by enough to support the imposition of a corporate tax
of 35% (or whatever the then-current corporate income tax rate). Cf. SCHWARCZ, supra
note 27, § 5:2.3 at 5-11.
68. Consolidation, or the 100% dividends received deductions that are available when
a corporation owns at least 80% of a subsidiary's equity, subjects the SPV's net income to a
single level of corporate tax. I.R.C. §§ 243(a)(2), (6); 1501; 1504(a) (2002).
69. For a detailed discussion of the tax treatment of securitizations, see generally
PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 15.
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level.70 In contrast, in the latter structure the securities represent secured
debt and the SPV is merely a device for holding the securitized assets as
collateral. The originator does not sell or dispose of the assets for tax
purposes. The originator claims interest deductions on the debt that shel-
ter income on the assets from any corporate-level tax.
A. PASS-THROUGH TRANSACTIONS
In many securitization transactions the SPV is organized as a state-law
trust. A trust is an entity not subject to tax if it qualifies as an investment
trust and its interest holders qualify as grantors. An investment trust ex-
ists if there is no power under the trust agreement to vary the investment
of the interest holders. 71 To meet this test, a trust must generally be a
passive investor-it must exist to hold investments on behalf of its inter-
est holders and cannot engage in business. Accordingly, the permissible
activities of an investment trust are quite circumscribed. For example,
the trust can sell assets, but generally must promptly distribute the sales
proceeds. 72 It generally cannot reinvest those proceeds or otherwise ac-
quire new assets without jeopardizing its tax status. The originator in a
securitization qualifies as a grantor, as do investors who subsequently
purchase trust securities. 73
Because no income tax is imposed at the entity level in this structure,
income and other tax items flow through to the holders of the trust secur-
ities.74 A grantor is treated as owner of the portion of the trust over
which it has control, and as deriving the tax items (income, deduction,
gain, loss, and credits) attributable to that portion directly. 75 Thus, each
investor is in effect an owner of a proportionate undivided interest in the
assets held by the trust and obligor on a proportionate share of the liabili-
ties to which the entity is subject.76 Income, deductions, gain, and loss on
the trust's assets and liabilities pass through to each investor as if each
70. These entities may also issue debt. This is described later in this discussion. See
infra text accompanying note 112.
71. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c) (as amended in 1996).
72. See PEASLEE & NMRENBERG, supra note 15, at 177-79 (discussing permissible in-
vestment trust activities).
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.671-2(e)(1), (3) (as amended in 2002). See Rev. Rul. 70-544, 1970-2
C.B. 6; Rev. Rul. 70-545, 1970-2 C.B. 7, modified by Rev. Rul. 74-169, 1974-1 C.B. 147;
PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 278-79.
74. PEASLEE & NiREN13ERG, supra note 15, at 281.
75. I.R.C. § 671 (2002); Treas. Reg. § 1.671-2(a) (as amended in 2000).
76. Grantors are owners and obligors for tax purposes, but may not be for other pur-
poses. Peaslee and Nirenberg say "the trust is ignored (collapsed into a co-ownership
arrangement) for almost all substantive tax purposes. While the language of section 671 is
not entirely clear on the point, the Service has issued a number of rulings and other pro-
nouncements disregarding grantor trusts." PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 281
(footnote omitted). One interesting result is that each grantor of a fixed investment trust
can have distinct holding periods, basis, bond premia and market discounts for its interest
in the underlying property. This can occur, for example, if investors purchase securities at
different times. In addition, holders can use different accounting methods to determine
annual income or deductions.
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investor was the direct owner or obligor.77 Consequently, the tax items
passed through to the investors retain their character in the investors'
hands. 78 Tax is imposed only at the investor level, and distributions of
funds from the trust are not themselves subject to tax.79
The prohibition on reinvestment imposes a significant obstacle to the
use of the pass-through structure other than to securitize relatively long-
lived assets such as real estate mortgage loans. Another constraint is that
grantor trusts generally may not have multiple classes of ownership inter-
ests. Under the so-called Sears regulations, promulgated in the mid-
1980s,80 a trust that has multiple classes of ownership interests is classified
for tax purposes as a partnership or corporation unless the multiple clas-
ses are "incidental" to the purpose of facilitating "direct investment in the
assets of the trust."81 These regulations prevent grantor trusts from issu-
ing securities that have different maturities or that otherwise represent
economically different interests in the trust's assets, unless they meet the
"incidental" test of the regulations or are classified as debt.82
If the securitization structure qualifies as a grantor trust, the originator
realizes no gain or loss on the exchange of assets for interest in the trust.
However, any sale of the trust interests to others is treated as a sale of the
underlying assets, and so the originator must recognize gain or loss as if a
portion of those assets were sold directly.
If the SPV does not qualify as a grantor trust it still may be able to
avoid entity-level tax. An entity that is not a trust is either a partnership
or a corporation for income tax purposes.8 3 If it is characterized as a
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.671-3(a)(3) (as amended in 1969). This feature gives rise to the
commonly-used name for the trust interests: pass-through certificates. See PEASLEE &
NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 18, 288.
78. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c) (as amended in 1996). For example, an owner of an
interest in a trust that held only tax-exempt bonds would receive tax-exempt interest. If
the trust held real estate mortgages, the interest holder would be treated as holding real
estate assets (which would be relevant, for example, to whether the holder can qualify as a
real estate investment trust under I.R.C. § 856(c)(2)-(4) (2002)).
79. See PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 19.
80. The "Sears regulations" were proposed in 1984. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c),
49 Fed. Reg. 18741 (May 2, 1984). They were finalized in 1986. T.D. 8080, 1986-1 C.B. 371,
51 Fed. Reg. 9950 (March 24, 1986).
81. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c)(1) (as amended in 1996). See also PEASLEE &
NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 196; James M. Peaslee, Investment Trusts in the Age of Finan-
cial Derivatives, 49 TAX L. REv. 419, 450 (1994). The regulations provide two very limited
examples of arrangements that meet the "incidental" test: one in which one class is subor-
dinated to the other in a manner that provides a limited guarantee of payment from the
originator of the loans held by the trust to the other holders of trust interests; and one in
which the interests merely allow stripping of interest coupons from bonds held by the
trusts. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c)(2) exs. 2, 4 (as amended in 1996).
82. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c)(2) exs. 2, 4 (as amended in 1996). As used herein, the
term "corporation" usually is intended to mean a domestic corporation subject to tax at the
entity level under Subchapter C of Chapter 1 of Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code
(a "C corporation").
83. This statement assumes there is more than one holder of an equity interest in the
SPV. If there is only one owner, the transaction is not really a securitization unless the
entity also issues debt, as described below. A business entity that is not characterized for
tax purposes as a corporation and that has only one owner is ignored for tax purposes.
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partnership, its income flows through and is taxed to its partners. Under
current law, it is relatively easy for a trust or other domestic, non-corpo-
rate entity to qualify as a partnership. Under the "check-the-box" entity
classification rules adopted in 1996, a trust that fails to qualify as a gran-
tor trust is treated as a partnership unless it elects otherwise.8 4
Partnership characterization is available to an entity that has a multiple
class ownership structure or that actively manages its assets and liabilities.
For example, an SPV that relies on partnership classification can acquire
new assets or reinvest proceeds from the sale or payoff of receivables.
Thus, securitizations can be structured to qualify for partnership status,
and many transactions in which the SPV is intended to qualify as a gran-
tor trust use partnership characterization as a fallback position. 5
However, the partnership structure is also of limited utility for securi-
tizing assets. A publicly traded partnership is subject to tax as a corpora-
tion unless it qualifies for an exception. 86 This presents a problem in
securitization transactions because they are often utilized to create mar-
ketable securities.87 If, however, 90% of a partnership's gross income is
passive income such as dividends, interest, rents and royalties, the pub-
licly traded partnership rules do not apply.88 It is thought that most
securitization transactions meet this requirement.8 9 Interest arising from
a financial business, however, is not qualifying income. 90 Since the bor-
der between a financial business and other activities is unclear, structures
that are intended to rely on partnership status to avoid entity-level tax
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2001); Rev. Rul. 99-5, 1999-1 C.B. 434. It
is a "tax nothing," to use a common phrase. If this tax nothing also issues debt the transac-
tion is much like a pay-through securitization discussed infra at notes 112-15.
84. Generally speaking, a state-law trust is not a per se corporation under the Treasury
Regulation, and thus would be characterized as a partnership unless it elected otherwise.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as amended in 2002); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in
2001). See PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 155-56 (discussing Treas. Reg.
§§ 301.7701-2(b) (as amended in 2002), 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2001)).
85. See Mark P. Gergen, Subchapter K and Passive Financial Intermediation, 51 SMU
L. REV. 37, 38-39 (1997); SCHWARCZ, supra note 27, § 5:2.3 at 5-12.
86. I.R.C. § 7704(a) (2002).
87. As discussed below, when the entity also issues instruments treated as debt for tax
purposes, it may not be necessary for the equity of the entity to be traded. An instrument
classified as debt for tax purposes is not taken into account for purposes of determining
whether the partnership is publicly traded. Treas. Reg. § 301.7704-1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended
in 1995). In that case, organizing documents or other agreements may have provisions
intended to prevent the entity from being treated as publicly traded, such as limitations on
numbers of partners or on transfers of the partnership interests. See SCHWARCZ, supra
note 27, § 5:2.3 at 5-18. For a detailed discussion of the rules for determining whether a
partnership is publicly traded, see PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 247-52.
88. Technically, 90% of the partnership's income must be "qualifying income" for the
taxable year and all prior taxable years in which the partnership was a publicly traded
partnership. I.R.C. § 7704(c) (2002). For a detailed discussion of this issue, see PEASLEE &
NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 252-73.
89. PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 245 ("Most securitization vehicles hold-
ing largely fixed pools of debt instruments (including hedges) escape section 7704 by meet-
ing the passive income test.").
90. I.R.C. § 7704(d)(2)(A) (2002).
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tend to limit the activities in which the SPV can engage. 91
There are other disadvantages of utilizing the partnership structure.
The tax law that applies to partnerships is complex and difficult for inves-
tors to understand. Investors are generally thought not to like receiving
partnership tax information returns, and there is said to be a general in-
vestor disdain for partnership interests.92 In addition, some investors are
not permitted to hold partnership interests. 93
Before 1996, partnership status was much less useful in a securitization.
At that time it was less certain that a failed grantor trust could qualify as
a partnership, and purposefully meeting the qualifications could be bur-
densome.94 The regulations in effect until the early 1990s characterized
entities as corporations or partnerships based on certain substantive char-
acteristics.95 This made it much less clear that an SPV could rely on part-
nership status as a fallback if it failed to qualify as a grantor trust.
SPVs that issued multiple classes of interests generally issued those in-
struments as debt and were often structured so that a residual equity class
would be characterized as partnership interests under the regulations. 96
Organizers imposed restrictions on these SPVs so that they would lack
centralized management and freely transferable interests, and required
that they have at least one partner with a substantial ownership interest
who was liable for the entity's expenses.97 These strictures had several
effects. First, to avoid centralized management the SPV was generally
subject to substantially the same restrictions on its activities as a grantor
trust.98 Second, to avoid having freely transferable interests, the SPV's
91. This issue arises most often in securitizations of credit card receivables, which is
usually accomplished through the collateralized debt structure, discussed later in this sec-
tion. See infra text accompanying notes 119-32.
92. See, e.g., Richard J. Koreto, Finding Treats in REITs: Investors Who've Abandoned
the Tech Sector in Favor of Something More Stable May Find What They're Looking For in
Real Estate Investment Trusts, FIN. PLAN., Apr. 1, 2001 (touting the avoidance of receiving
a K-1 as a REIT selling point); Tom Pratt, SEC Issues No-Action Letters on Streamlined
Trust 'Mips', INv. DEALERS' DIG., May 8, 1995, at 13.
93. Gergen, supra note 85, at 39.
94. Id.
95. To qualify as a partnership, the entity could not have more than two of the follow-
ing four characteristics: (i) centralized management, (ii) limited liability, (iii) freely trans-
ferable interests, and (iv) continuity of life. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as amended by T.D.
7889, 48 Fed. Reg. 18,805 (Apr. 26, 1983)). For a brief but pithy discussion of the origin of
these regulations and their relationship to FASITs, REMICs and other special purpose
entities, see generally Willard B. Taylor, Beyond Check-the-Box-Neglected Issues, TAXES,
Dec. 1, 1997, at 671.
96. Proposal to Expand REMIC Provisions, supra note 28, at 317. Sometimes these
entities were structured as taxable corporations when they would be part of a consolidated
group for tax purposes, which would result in no additional corporate-level tax to the SPV.
Id. at 316 & n.54, 317.
97. Id. at 311 & n.57, 317. See also Gergen, supra note 85, at 39 ("While it was possi-
ble ... to structure an intermediary to avoid corporate classification without sacrificing the
crucial features of public trading, limited liability, and centralized management, doing so
required some contortions and left tax planners feeling exposed (even a little uncertainty
regarding an important issue such as partnership classification can kill a public offering of a
security).").
98. Proposal to Expand REMIC Provisions, supra note 28, at 317.
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organizational documents prevented the transfer of interests except in
limited circumstances. 99 The result was that there was no active market
for equity interests in these SPVs. °00 In addition, the equity cushion
needed to ensure that the debt issued by the SPV would be respected as
such reduced the efficiency of the structure relative to a grantor trust.1°1
When an SPV qualifies as a partnership (and is not taxed as a corpora-
tion), its income is not taxed at the entity level, but flows through to its
partners. 02 This is similar, but not identical to the treatment of the gran-
tor trust, because unlike a grantor trust, a partnership is an entity for
some tax purposes. Many differences in treatment may be observed. 0 3
For example, the partnership may use a different tax accounting method
than the partners do, 104 while a grantor trust has no accounting method.
Unlike a grantor trust, the partnership has a basis in its assets that is dis-
tinct from the basis its partners have in their interests. The partnership's
basis in its assets may be different than the partners' aggregate basis, and
it is the partnership's basis that is used in calculating the income of the
partnership. 0 5 While a partnership's cash distributions, like a grantor
trust's, are not generally included in a partner's gross income, they are (in
general) taxable to the extent the distributions, in the aggregate, exceed
the partner's tax basis.'0 6 More importantly, the allocation of income be-
tween interests representing different economic claims is more compli-
cated under the partnership structure simply because no analog exists
under the grantor trust structure.10 7
99. Id. at 317 n.61.
100. Id. at 317 & n.63.
101. Willard Taylor points out that implicit in the enactment of the REMIC and FASIT
legislation is an assumption that partnerships were "not viable alternatives to a statutory
pass-through vehicle." Taylor, supra note 95, at 673.
102. I.R.C. § 701 (2002).
103. For a catalogue of differences, see PEASLEE & NIRENBERI, supra note 15, at 322-
25.
104. I.R.C. §§ 703, 448 (2002) (requiring partnerships to use the accrual method of ac-
counting if any of its partners is a C corporation). See PEASLEE & NIRENnERG, supra note
15, at 294.
105. A partnership can elect to adjust the basis in its assets when a partnership interest
is purchased. I.R.C. § 754 (2002). This helps reduce the difference between the inside
basis of a partnership in its assets and the outside basis of partners in their interests. See
PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 301. Before 1997, there would be limited differ-
ences between inside and outside basis for a partnership that had publicly traded interests
(but was not classified as a publicly traded partnership). If more than 50% of its interests
were sold or exchanged by partners to non-partners within a 12-month period, the partner-
ship would be terminated and all of its assets would be treated as distributed to partners
(thereby obtaining the same basis as the partners' interests under I.R.C. § 732(b) (1997))
and recontributed to the partnership (retaining their new basis) under I.R.C. § 722 (1997).
PEASILEc & NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 300 & n.77. This result was changed by Treas.
Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(l) (as amended by T.D. 8717, 1997-1 C.B. 125). PEASLFE &
NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 300-01, 301 & n.78.
106. I.R.C. §§ 731(a)(1) (2002) (treating cash received as income only to the extent it
exceeds the partner's basis), 733 (2002) (reducing the partner's basis by cash distributions
and basis of property distributed).
107. For a description of problems in allocating partnership income in a securitization,
see PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 302-12. For a discussion of allocating income
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The overall tax ramifications of the formation of a securitization part-
nership are similar to those for a grantor trust. When a single originator
transfers receivables to an SPV that is a partnership in exchange for inter-
ests, and the originator promptly sells the interests, the transaction is
treated as a transfer of the assets by the originator to the investors and
contribution of the assets by the investors to the SPV.1°8 Thus, the origi-
nator must recognize gain or loss on the sale of the securitized assets to
the extent of the interest in those assets represented by the partnership
interests it sells. 109 The other investors recognize no gain or loss on the
deemed contribution of assets to the SPV.110 The originator recognizes
no gain or loss to the extent of the interest it retains in the SPV."11
As mentioned earlier, SPVs can issue debt instruments as well as eq-
uity interests. The debt securities are commonly called collateralized
debt obligations or collateralized mortgage obligations, and are often is-
sued by owner trusts. These securities are much like pass-through certifi-
cates: the interest and principal on the debt is generally paid from
securitized assets' cash flows. Yet these securities take the form of debt
and are intended to be respected as debt for tax purposes.112 Thus, an
investor who holds the debt does not have an ownership interest in the
underlying assets. The investor receives interest from the SPV, not in-
come from the assets.1 13 An originator may choose to issue debt through
an SPV because, unlike ownership interests in a grantor trust, the debt
can be issued in multiple classes with different maturities, seniorities, in-
and other tax items among grantors with different economic interests in a grantor trust, see
Peaslee, supra note 81, at 450-65.
108. Until more than one person owns an interest in the SPV, it is disregarded as an
entity and its owner is treated as directly owning the assets. See supra note 83. Different
concerns arise when the SPV is formed by two or more partners who contribute assets. In
that case it is possible for the investment company rules to apply and cause the contribu-
tors to recognize gain on the contribution. I.R.C § 721(a)-(b) (2002). PEASLEE &
NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 887-89.
109. There are numerous caveats to this statement, but in general the taxpayer will
recognize gain oK loss equal to the amount realized on the sale minus the basis allocable to
the portion of the assets disposed of. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2002). The amount realized would
include any indebtedness incurred by the SPV and allocable to the interests of the purchas-
ers of the securities. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2 (1980).
110. I.R.C. § 721(a) (2002). Any indebtedness to which the SPV's assets are subject
should generally have no effect on the tax treatment of the purchasers' deemed contribu-
tion to the SPV unless the SPV has more than one class of equity interests. PEASLEE &
NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 891 & n.39 (discussing I.R.C. § 752 (2002)).
111. I.R.C. § 721(a) (2002).
112. To obtain this treatment there generally must be a difference between the pay-
ments received on the underlying assets and the payments made on the debt. For example,
there may be significant lags between the time payments are collected on the assets and
payments are made on the receivables. This factor, which requires reinvestment by the
SPV, makes it difficult for an SPV that issues debt to qualify as a grantor trust. In addition,
there must be a sufficient equity cushion to prevent the debt from being recharacterized as
equity for tax purposes (and thereby depriving the SPV of an interest deduction). See
PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 31, 103-18.
113. This can be significant when tax rules require an entity to receive income from
certain sources or hold a certain percentage of its assets in a specified type of investment.
Real estate mortgage investment conduits, which must hold and derive income from real
estate assets, are one example of such a taxpayer. See I.R.C. § 856(c)(2)-(4) (2002).
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terest rates (including rates unrelated to those on the underlying assets),
and other features. 114 However, this structure may not be as advanta-
geous from a financial accounting perspective as a pass-through structure
because the originator often needs to dispose of a greater percentage of
its interest in the securitized assets when the SPV issues debt to obtain
off-balance sheet treatment." 15
The SPV realizes no gain or loss upon receiving the proceeds from issu-
ing debt, and interest accruals on the debt are generally deductible
against the income generated by the securitized assets. Thus, in some
cases, a securitization that includes debt securities may be as advanta-
geous, or even more advantageous from a tax perspective, than a pure
pass-through structure. A securitization transaction that involves debt,
however, can generate significant mismatches of annual income and de-
duction at the entity level without corresponding mismatches in cash
flow.11 6 For example, if an SPV holds long-term debt instruments that it
fully securitizes by issuing classes of debt with different maturities (but
with the same weighted average maturity as the assets), the SPV will have
more interest income than expense in the early years, and more expense
than income in the later years. This can result in radically different pat-
terns of annual income and loss to equity owners compared to patterns of
annual income in a securitization when no debt is issued.
The most significant tax issue for this type of arrangement is the sub-
stantial equity interest in the securitized assets that must exist for debt
114. A trust that issued multiple classes of interests with these features could be charac-
terized as a corporation, and all its interests as equity interests. Thus, it could be subject to
entity-level tax on all its income from the securitized assets. Interests treated as debt re-
duce the amount of taxable income at the entity level by providing interest deductions.
This structure was invented before the 1996 change in the check-the-box entity classifica-
tion rules, which makes it more likely that a trust that fails to qualify as a grantor trust will
be treated as a partnership for tax purposes. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
115. When FASIT legislation was enacted, accounting rules required an originator to
dispose of at least 50% of the equity of the SPV to avoid financial statement consolidation
with the SPV. See PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 33-35; SCHWARCZ, supra note
27, § 5:2.3 at 5-13. This imposed a significant burden on structures that utilized securities
issued in the form of debt. Current accounting rules may make it easier for some origina-
tors to accomplish this result while holding a larger equity interest in the SPV. See Marty
Rosenblatt et al., Securitization Accounting Under FASB 140: The Standard Formerly
Known as FASB 125, Deloitte & Touche (2d ed. 2002) (on file with the SMU Law Review).
This allows the publicly traded interests in SPVs to take the form of debt, making it less
likely that the partnership interests in the entity would be treated as publicly traded. See
also PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 34-35; Peaslee & Nirenberg, It's Time to
Bag the FASIT Rules and Start Over, supra note 18, n.7; SCHWARCZ, supra note 27, § 7:4 at
7-11.
116. Typically, if long-term cash flow assets support debt classes that are similar to
stripped coupons and principal, income at the entity level will be accelerated, in some cases
causing the entity to have high net income in early years and net losses in later years. This
effect can be reversed if long-term debt is supported by a series of payments on cash flow
assets with different maturities. The difference in income on the asset and the income at
the entity level is often referred to as "phantom income." For a full exploration of this
issue, see Kirk Van Brunt, Tax Aspects of REMIC Residual Interests, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 149,
211-15 (1994). See also infra note 146. The problem of phantom income was probably one
of the motivating factors behind the adoption of the Sears regulations. See Peaslee, supra
note 81, at 456-57.
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characterization to be respected. This makes the securitization structure
less efficient than one that requires no equity cushion, such as the grantor
trust structure. In addition, the level of equity necessary depends on sev-
eral factors. The most significant consideration is the riskiness of the
securitized assets. The more uncertain the payments on the securitized
assets, the greater the equity cushion needed to assure timely payment on
the debt.117 Reducing or eliminating the need for an equity cushion by
issuing debt with terms that link payments to actual receipts on the un-
derlying assets risks recharacterization of the structure as a conduit and
the debt as equity interests. In that case the arrangement is a partnership
or a corporation, and the proceeds from the issuance of the recharacter-
ized debt are treated as amounts received from the sale of the securitized
assets."18
B. PASS-THROUGH INTERESTS AS COLLATERALIZED DEBT
In some cases the parties to a securitization transaction intend for it to
be treated for tax purposes as a financing rather than a sale, and for the
SPV to be treated as a mechanism for holding collateral, rather than as an
entity that owns the securitized assets. In this structure the SPV's securi-
ties take the form of beneficial interests in a trust holding cash-flow as-
sets. This form is driven by accounting rule considerations.' 19 But for tax
purposes the securities are meant to qualify as debt instruments secured
by the assets.' 20 Payments on these securities typically reflect the pay-
ments on the underlying assets and the assets are generally expected to
be the primary or sole source of payments on the securities.' 2 ' Accruals
of interest deductions on the securities offset income from the securitized
assets.
This structure allows much greater flexibility than the grantor trust or
partnership structures. Tax considerations do not prevent the originator
from freely transferring new assets to the trust or substituting one asset
for another: this activity is even helpful in sustaining the characterization
of the transaction as a secured borrowing because it reinforces the posi-
117. One factor that contributes to the debt characterization is a relatively low risk,
evidenced by a relatively low yield on an instrument. If the risk on "debt" issued by an
SPV was comparable to the risk on underlying assets, there is a likelihood that the instru-
ment would be recharacterized as equity for tax purposes, which may defeat the purpose of
the structure.
118. If the entity is classified as a corporation, the transaction might be treated as a
contribution of assets to the corporation and a sale of stock. This would be particularly
disadvantageous if the assets had built-in gain: the gain from the sale of the stock would be
subject to tax but would not provide amortizable bond premium deductions under I.R.C.
§ 171 (2002) to offset the income on the entity's assets. The structure with recharacterized
debt could not qualify as a grantor trust because of the multiple classes of interests and the
potential for reinvestment of proceeds from the assets. While the entity would retain its
partnership classification under the check-the-box rues, it is uncertain whether such part-
nership would nonetheless be treated as a taxable corporation due to public trading in its
interests. I.R.C. § 7704(c) (2002).
119. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
120. See PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 38.
121. Id. at 38-39.
2003]
SMU LAW REVIEW
tion that the originator, rather than the SPV or security holders, controls
the securitized assets. The assets can support multiple classes of securi-
ties, and new tranches can be issued over time as new assets are added to
the SPV. In addition, the sponsor can call assets or classes of securities to
take advantage of market changes without disrupting the tax characteri-
zation of the transaction.' 22
Credit card and other short-term consumer debt is commonly securi-
tized this way. These assets tend to have short maturities, but the securi-
tization allows them to be financed with longer-term obligations. In
general, principal payments the originator or the servicer collects on be-
half of the SPV are reinvested in new receivables, rather than being dis-
tributed to security holders, for some period. Accordingly, the assets that
provide for payments on the trust securities change, perhaps many times
over the life of the securities.' 23
Credit card securitizations tend to follow a specific transactional
form.124 An originator (usually referred to as the sponsor) typically
transfers outstanding draws on credit card accounts to a trust and agrees
that subsequent draws on those accounts will also go to the trust. The
trust issues certificates to investors, and the sponsor also retains an inter-
est. The sponsor's interest is generally not subordinated to the other in-
terests. The investors' interests usually provide that they will receive
their proportionate share of interest, but no principal, from the credit
card receivables during a "revolving" period. During the re-volving pe-
riod, principal payments on the receivables are distributed to the sponsor
and new draws are credited to the sponsor's interest, with the result that
the sponsor's percentage interest in the trust fluctuates over time. After
the revolving period, the sponsor and other interest holders share in prin-
cipal payments on a pro rata basis. This is called the amortization period.
The sponsor also usually undertakes to transfer receivables on other ac-
counts to prevent its interest from dropping below a certain point during
the revolving period. If its interest drops too low, the amortization pe-
riod is triggered prematurely.
Credit card securitizations have several other common features. It is
not unusual for a sponsor to transfer receivables (especially those repre-
senting draws on new accounts) to a trust some time before the trust is to
122. Id. Some of these activities might, however, be limited by accounting considera-
tions. Id. at 66-67.
123. See id. at 39, 130-31.
124. See, e.g., Prospectus Supplement, American Express Credit Account Master Trust,
Series 2002-4, at http://www.sec.gov (last visited Oct. 26, 2002) (on file with the SMU Law
Review); Prospectus Supplement, Sears Credit Account Master Trust II, Series 2002-4, at
http://www.sec.gov (last visited Oct. 26, 2002) (on file with the SMU Law Review). How-
ever, since the adoption of FAS 140, interests in the form of trust certificates have given
way somewhat to interests in the form of credit card-backed notes. See, e.g., Prospectus
Supplement, MBNA Credit Account Master Note Trust, MBNA Series 2002-6, at http://
www.sec.gov (last visited Oct. 26, 2002) (on file with the SMU Law Review). For a discus-
sion of credit card securitizations before the enactment of the FASIT legislation, see Pro-
posal to Expand REMIC Provisions, supra note 28, at 320-22. For a more recent discussion
of credit card securitizations, see PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 132-37.
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issue certificates representing interests in the receivables. This allows the
accounts to age and develop a performance history that is valuable in the
securitization process. Secondly, the trusts are often a funding facility
that is used by several members of an affiliated group. These members
combine their securitizations under one roof, so to speak. This kind of
arrangement is commonly called a master trust.
Several aspects of these transactions are significant for concluding the
SPV should be treated as holding collateral on behalf of the originator.
The originator usually retains power to place receivables in the SPV or, to
a limited extent, remove them. In addition, because the securitized re-
ceivables tend to bear interest at rates much higher than the SPV's securi-
ties, the originator retains a relatively high and variable spread. The
securities are generally significantly over-collateralized, and the amounts
that are not required to make payments on the securities are returned to
the originator. These factors are consistent with the originator retaining
the benefits and burdens of ownership on the receivables.1 25
However, because the securities take the form of beneficial interests
rather than debt, tax advisors tend to be quite conservative about render-
ing opinions that they are properly characterized as such for tax pur-
poses. 126 The practice is to require the securities to carry a high credit
rating, indicating a low level of risk of default or delinquency, to insure
debt treatment. Historically, a security issued in a credit card securitiza-
tion must carry one of the top three investment grade ratings to obtain a
clean opinion that the instrument is debt for tax purposes. 127 This, in
effect, limits the extent to which credit card receivables can be monetized:
instruments with these ratings have low risk and low interest rates. The
excess cash flow on the receivables over that needed to pay interest and
principal on the securities is retained by the originator and cannot be
securitized.
Though the limitation on the extent to which receivables can be mone-
tized using this structure may be a negative, the transaction is advanta-
geous in that the originator recognizes no gain on the receipt of cash from
the sale of the securities. Since the transaction is a financing rather than a
sale, the proceeds from the securities are borrowings and are not included
in the originator's gross income. Conversely, the originator is not entitled
to any deduction for repayment of principal to the security holders.
125. For a complete discussion of recharacterizing equity interests as debt, see PEASLEE
& NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 130-48.
126. See, e.g., Peaslee & Nirenberg, It's Time to Bag the FASIT Rules and Start Over,
supra note 18.
127. See PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 122 n.148 (describing pass-through
certificates treated as debt). Thus, a longer-term security generally must be rated A or
better by Standard & Poor's Rating Group or Moody's Investors' Service, Inc. to obtain a
clean opinion. Id. See also Donald B. Susswein, Attorney Testifies in Support of FASIT Bill
on Behalf of Coalition for Asset Backed Securities, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 186-37 (1995)
(requiring issuers to be able to point to "strong proof" that the security is in substance




Assuming that the securities are respected as debt for tax purposes, the
holders of the securities are treated as holders of debt rather than owners
of the securitized receivables. Accordingly, they calculate their income,
gains, deductions, and losses using the normal rules that apply to debt
instruments.
A transaction that fails to qualify as a secured financing is likely to be
treated as a sale of the receivables to the SPV. As discussed earlier,
before the 1996 change in the entity classification regulations it was un-
clear in such a case whether the SPV would be characterized as a partner-
ship or corporation. 12 8 Under the new regulations there is much less
chance that the SPV would be classified as a corporation.12 9 Even when
the entity is a partnership under the general entity classification rules,
however, there is a risk that it would be treated as a corporation for tax
purposes. If the SPV securities are treated as partnership interests, and
any class of those securities is publicly traded, the entity could be a pub-
licly traded partnership, and thus potentially taxable as a corporation. 130
Although the entity might qualify for the passive income exception to the
publicly traded partnership rules, 131 there is a risk that its activities relat-
ing to the receivables might cause it to be treated as engaged in an active
finance business. 132 If the entity's activities do not qualify for the excep-
tion, the entity would be taxable as a corporation.
C. REMICs
Much of the foregoing discussion is a background for the REMIC pro-
visions as well as the FASIT legislation. But before FASITs can be un-
derstood, a picture of the antecedent statutory securitization vehicle must
be developed. The following description of the REMIC rules and their
background is necessarily brief: the rules are tremendously detailed and
the scheme is quite complex. Nonetheless, they demonstrate a particular
strategy for dealing with the problem of asset securitizations that carried
through to the FASIT regime. They also help show how the FASIT rules
went wrong.
The REMIC vehicle was created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986.133 In
light of the increasing pace of secondary market transactions in mort-
128. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
130. I.R.C. § 7704(a) (2002).
131. Id. § 7704(c); see supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
132. The almost constant reinvestment needed to accommodate the quick payoff of
assets held by the SPV and the likelihood that new receivables would come from charges
made on the same accounts as the prior receivables makes it conceivable that the credit
card users could be considered customers of the SPV and thus the SPV would be engaged
in the financial services business of originating loans to customers. See, e.g., Michael L.
Schler, Comments on Prop. Reg. Section 1.7704-1, reprinted in Schler Says Proposed PTP
Regs. are Potentially Disastrous for Asset-Backed Securitizations, 95 TAX NoTEs TODAY
166-12 (1995); PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 245-46, 271-73.
133. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 671-675, 100 Stat. 2085, 2308-
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gages occurring at the time, Congress intended to clarify the tax rules that
would apply to the transactions and provide "some relief" from the cor-
porate-level tax.134 But the statute and the legislative history also
demonstrate an understanding that the regime would be susceptible to
abuse. Without safeguards the REMIC structure could be exploited to
shift income to tax-exempt entities and offsetting losses to taxable enti-
ties.' 35 Thus, the legislation was an attempt to balance the interests of
simplicity and clarity for securitizations of real estate mortgages against
concerns that the legislation might poke a hole in the fiscal bucket
through which significant amounts of revenue could leak.'
36
As discussed earlier in this piece, the problem for mortgage securitiza-
tions in the period before the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was that grantor
trusts could not issue multiple classes of ownership interests, and the
availability of partnership status was uncertain.' 37 The Sears Regulations
prevented the grantor trust structure from being employed to slice differ-
ent economic shares out of the underlying assets. This problem could
have been avoided if grantor trusts could issue instruments that qualified
as debt for tax purposes, but it was not entirely certain a trust could do so
without jeopardizing its grantor trust status. 138 In addition, because it is
advantageous for some investors to hold interests in real estate mortgage
loans, debt would be less desirable than pass-through interests. While
partnership status offered another possible escape from entity-level tax, it
was unclear at the time whether a trust structured to securitize mortgage
loans could meet the tests for this status. These hurdles made it more
costly to securitize mortgages, and as a consequence limited the quantity
of mortgages that could be repackaged and sold in advantageous ways to
the capital markets.
The creators of the REMIC regime took a logical approach to eliminat-
ing, or at least lowering these hurdles: they attempted to describe in legis-
lation the features of the paradigm transaction and then solve some of its
134. J. COMM. ON TAX'N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986,
JCS-10-87, at 411 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter 1986 Blue Book].
135. Id. at 411-12 (expressing concern that the REMIC could lead to "certain system-
atic opportunities to avoid taxation on a portion of income derived from the pool of mort-
gages through the use of tax-exempt entities, foreign persons, and taxpayers with net
operating loss carryovers").
136. It is interesting to note, however, that the legislation did not attempt to retain the
revenue status quo. It was recognized that income would escape the corporate tax because
of the rules. The provision was scored as losing a modest amount of revenue-$196 million
over five years. Id. at 1365 tbl.A-2.
137. See supra notes 80-82 and 86-95 and accompanying text.
138. There is a small risk that such a trust would violate the Sears Regulations prohibi-
tion on multiple class grantor trusts. In addition, depending on the terms of the debt, there
is a risk that the borrowing could cause the trust to have the power to vary the investments
of its certificate holders and thus be classified as a partnership or corporation under Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-4(c) (1996). See Peaslee, supra note 81, at 444-45. If the instruments were
classified as equity the entity would certainly violate the prohibition on multiple class gran-
tor trusts. If the instruments were issued in the form of debt to shore up their tax status the
transaction would simply be trading off a tax problem for an accounting problem. See
supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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problems. Thus, for example, the legislation's limits on a REMIC's activ-
ities approximate the restrictions that apply to grantor trusts. In some
ways a REMIC is subject to even tighter restrictions than a grantor trust.
A REMIC is permitted do little else but hold assets, and the only sub-
stantial assets it is permitted to hold are debt instruments secured by in-
terests in real estate.1 39 These assets must be acquired shortly after a
REMIC commences activities, 40 and the REMIC may not dispose of
them except in unusual circumstances. 14'
The legislation solved the problem of allocating income among multi-
ple classes of trust interests by treating a REMIC as issuing debt.
REMIC regular interests are debt instruments regardless of whether they
would otherwise qualify, 42 but are subject to limitations that make accru-
als of income on the instruments relatively predictable. 43 Naturally, the
REMIC is explicitly permitted to issue as regular interests the fast-pay/
slow-pay securities that are proscribed under the Sears regulations. 144
The REMIC rules depart from the grantor trust model by making the
REMIC income calculation similar to that of a simple partnership. A
REMIC calculates its net taxable income or net loss by deducting the
interest accruals on the regular interests. Its net income or net loss flows
through to the owners of its single class of equity interests, called residual
interests. 145 This supplies the mechanism for calculating and allocating
139. I.R.C. §§ 860D(a)(4), 860G(a)(3)-(7) (2002). A REMIC is permitted to invest
cash flow temporarily in other assets. It may also hold a regular interest in another
REMIC, a reserve fund, or foreclosure property. Id. § 860G(a)(3). REMICs are also al-
lowed under regulations to hold credit enhancement contracts. Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(c)
(as amended in 1993).
140. I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(A) (2002) (defining qualified mortgages). A mortgage that
replaces a mortgage held by the REMIC within three months of the start-up date, or that
replaces a defective mortgage within two years of the start-up date is also a qualified mort-
gage. Id. § 860G(a)(4).
141. In general, income from dispositions of REMIC assets is subject to a 100% penalty
tax unless specified exceptions apply. Id. § 860F(a). A REMIC may dispose of an asset
incident to (1) foreclosure, default or imminent default of a loan; (2) its bankruptcy or
insolvency; (3) its liquidation; (4) to avoid default on a regular interest due to a default on
an asset it holds; or (5) to facilitate the redemption of a class of interests which has a small
remaining balance. Id. § 860F(a)(2)(A), (a)(5).
142. I.R.C. § 860D(a)(2) (2002); see 1986 Blue Book, supra note 134, at 415 ("The Con-
gress intended that regular interest in REMICs may be issued in the form of debt, stock,
partnership interests, interests in a trust, or any other form.").
143. A regular interest is required to provide unconditionally for principal payments or
something akin to principal payments. If it provides for interest payments, those payments
must be based on a fixed rate or certain variable rates, or must represent interest stripped
from the underlying mortgages. I.R.C. § 860G(a)(1) (2002). Accruals on REMIC regular
interests are unpredictable primarily due to variations in the speed at which the interests
mature because of prepayments on the underlying assets. An assumption of prepayment
rate is required to be made for purposes of determining accruals, and special methods to
take into account actual payment rates are also mandated. See id. § 1272(a)(6).
144. Id. § 860G(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-l(b)(3)(i) (as amended in 1995); Id.
§ 301.7701-4(c)(2), ex. I (as amended in 1996) (giving an example of a prohibited multi-
class trust with fast-pay and slow-pay interests).
145. A REMIC must have one and only one class of residual interests. I.R.C.
§ 860D(a)(3) (2002). An interest is a residual interest if it is issued on the REMIC's start-




Phantom income and loss arise in a REMIC when the portion of in-
coming cash flows that represents interest income is different than the
portion of outgoing cash flows that represents interest expense. Even if
cash flows on mortgages and regular interests are identical, and there is
no net economic income to the REMIC, the REMIC will have phantom
income in early years and phantom loss in later years if the REMIC fi-
nances mortgages with instruments that have shorter maturities. Over
time these amounts will exactly offset each other, but in any particular
year interest income will not match expense. This phenomenon results
from an interaction of a tax convention with economic reality. The con-
vention is that interest accrues at a single constant rate over the life of an
instrument. The economic reality is that interest does not accrue at a
constant rate, but (assuming a positive yield curve) at higher rates for
later payments. 46 Thus, a single long-term instrument will accrue interest
at a rate different from the rate at which its constituent pieces would
accrue interest.
Phantom income in a REMIC flows through to the residual interest
holders. The REMIC "excess inclusion" rules provide a mechanism for
approximating phantom income and imposing tax regardless of whether
the residual interest holder would otherwise pay tax.147 This is intended
to prevent taxpayers from engaging in a strategy to shift phantom income
to non-taxpaying entities.
The excess inclusion rules are backstopped by procedural rules in-
tended to discourage transfers of residual interests to those who are be-
yond U.S. taxing jurisdiction. 148 Further supporting the excess inclusion
requirements except that distributions on the residual interests must be pro rata. Id.
§ 860C(a)(2)(A).
Technically the REMIC must calculate its taxable income or net loss using the accrual
method and as if it were an individual, with certain exceptions. Id. § 860C(b). A residual
interest holder takes into account its daily portion of the REMIC's taxable income or net
loss for the quarter. Id. § 860C(a).
146. See Gergen, supra note 85, at 60. To borrow a lucid example of this phenomenon
from Professor Gergen, imagine a REMIC holds one mortgage providing 8% interest and
paying interest and principal in three equal annual installments. The REMIC issues three
classes of regular interests, one with a one-year maturity and a 7.7% yield, one with a two-
year maturity and an 8% yield, and one with a three-year maturity and an 8.2% yield, each
entitled to one of the annual installments on the mortgage. Even though the cash flows
will match, the income and expense will not. The REMIC's interest income will be greater
than its interest expense in the first year (because the average rate on the regular interests
is less than 8%), and less than the interest expense in the last two years. Id. at 60 n.99. See
also Van Brunt, supra note 116, at 212-14 (providing more elaborate, better-developed
illustrations of the phantom income phenomenon).
147. A holder of a residual interest can never have income in a taxable year that is less
than its portion of "excess inclusion income." I.R.C. § 860E(a) (2002). For a full discus-
sion of the issues associated with the excess inclusion rules, see PEASLEE & NIRENBERG,
supra note 15, at 647-80; Van Brunt, supra note 116, at 210-25.
148. A REMIC is required to have reasonable arrangements to prevent persons who
cannot be subject to tax from holding its ownership interests. I.R.C. §§ 860D(a)(6)(A),
860E(e)(5) (2002). In addition, an excise tax is imposed on a transfer of a residual interest
to such a person, and the REMIC must maintain and make available information that
allows for the application of the excise tax. Id. §§ 860D(a)(6)(B), 860E(e).
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rules is a provision that attempts to make REMICs the exclusive method
of issuing multiple classes of interests backed by real estate mortgage
loans. 149 This makes many of the transactions described in the previous
sections less useful for securitizing mortgages than they were before en-
actment of the REMIC rules in 1986.
Transfers of assets to REMICs are subject to rules modeled on the way
contributions to grantor trusts or partnerships are taxed, but follow
neither precisely. As in the case of a transfer to a grantor trust or part-
nership, a transfer of assets to a REMIC in exchange for REMIC inter-
ests does not trigger gain or loss. Instead, the transferor takes a
substituted basis in the REMIC interests. 150 Accordingly, the transferor
recognizes gain or loss when interests are sold. The REMIC takes con-
tributed assets with a fair market value basis. 51 To reconcile the differ-
ence between the transferor's outside basis in REMIC interests and the
REMIC's new basis in the assets, the transferor is required to accrue
built-in gain or loss much as it would market discount or premium 152
when it retains an interest. 53 This parallels the results of an exchange of
property for grantor trust or partnership interests and subsequent sale of
the interests. The REMIC rules, however, result in different inside and
outside bases, but eliminate the complexity of treating each interest
holder as owning a direct, undivided interest in the trust's assets.' 54
In effect, a REMIC is taxed much like a partnership that issues multi-
ple classes of debt that cannot be recharacterized as equity. This holds
true regardless of the form of the REMIC securities and even when the
entity is thinly capitalized. 155 The one exception to this generalization is
the excess inclusion rules.
149. The taxable mortgage pool rules, contained in I.R.C. § 7701(i) (2002), treat as a
separate taxable corporation any entity or portion of an entity that holds real estate mort-
gages and issues multiple classes of debt obligations if payments on the debt obligations
bear a relationship to the payments on the mortgages.
150. Id. § 860F(b)(1)(A)-(B).
151. Id. § 860E(b)(2). The REMIC's fair market value basis can cause it to accrue a
different amount of income on the assets than the transferor would have because of the
application of the market discount and amortizable bond premium rules.
152. Market discount, which arises when a debt instrument is acquired for less than its
adjusted issue price, is accrued as additional interest income on the instrument. Amortiza-
ble bond premium, which arises when an amount greater than adjusted issue price is paid
for a debt instrument, is treated as an offset to interest income on the instrument. Id.
§§ 171(e), 1276.
153. Id. § 860F(b)(1)(C)-(D). Gain or loss attributable to a residual interest is accrued
ratably over the period in which the REMIC is expected to be in existence. Gain or loss
attributable to an interest is determined by the difference between the interest's basis and
its issue price.
154. The result of the grantor trust rules is that each piece of property held by the trust
will have many bases associated with the different owners. If all of the interests in a gran-
tor trust are sold at once, however, the basis in the assets held by the grantor trust will be,
at that time, equal to their fair market values.




In the lead-up to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congressmen introduced
a number of bills intended to facilitate secondary market sales of real
estate mortgages. At least one of those bills would have applied to a
broader class of assets than the ultimate legislation.1 56 It is not entirely
clear why the REMIC legislation took such a narrow approach, and there
does not seem to be a pure tax policy explanation for it.157 Not surpris-
ingly, shortly after the REMIC provisions were enacted interest groups
began work on designing an expanded statutory securitization regime.
Ultimately, concrete proposals to ease restrictions on securitizing non-
mortgage receivables and short-term mortgage loans emerged. The first
proposals would have expanded the preexisting REMIC regime to ac-
commodate these assets. 158 This would have necessitated making numer-
ous statutory changes to the types of assets REMICs could hold, the
activities they could engage in, and the mechanisms for taxing their inter-
est holders.
While at its inception, the idea was simply to modify the REMIC sec-
tions of the tax code to accommodate a broader class of securitizations, 59
the FASIT evolved over time into its own special purpose vehicle. As it
evolved, it seemed to have become less modeled on the REMIC provi-
sions and their foundation in grantor trust and partnership treatment, and
more modeled on the collateralized debt structure used in securitizing
credit card receivables. This is hardly illogical since credit card receiv-
156. See S. 1978, 99th Cong. (1985); 131 CONG. REC. S37,649-54 (1985) (introduced by
Senator Cranston).
157. The Treasury Department may have been worried about jumping the gun. The
mortgage-backed securities market was sufficiently well established that tax staffers proba-
bly felt they could grasp its workings. Securitization of other kinds of assets was nascent
and probably not well understood except by a small number of experts. In that situation it
seems wise to wait to see how the market shakes out before stepping in with legislation.
Cf. Proposal to Expand REMIC Provisions, supra note 28, at 308. Moreover, there was
undoubtedly greater pressure to do something for mortgage securitizations. See PEASLEE
& NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 36. The Treasury Department and Congress might also
have wanted to gain experience with the REMIC structure before expanding it to other
assets and transactions. Proposal to Expand REMIC Provisions, supra note 28, at 309 n.33
(citing Dep't of Treasury, Review of Tax Treatment of Mortgage-Related Securities and
Environmental Zone Legislation: Hearings on S. 1839, S. 1959, and S. 1978 Before the
Subcomm. on Tax'n and Debt Mgmt. of the S. Fin. Comm., 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, 77(1986) (Statement of Dennis E. Ross, Acting Tax Legislative Counsel), reprinted in 86 TAX
NOTES TODAY 24-4 (1986); Dep't of Treasury, Statement Before the Subcommittee on
Select Revenue Measures of the Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of
Representatives on H.R. 4448, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1986), reprinted in 86 TAX NOTES
TODAY 116-8 (1986); 131 CONG. REC. S17,767 (1985) (Statement of Senator Chafee on S.
1959)).
158. See generally Proposal to Expand REMIC Provisions, supra note 28; Susswein,
supra note 127, at 4.
159. See generally Proposal to Expand REMIC Provisions, supra note 28. The proposal
contained in this letter was an explicit amendment to the REMIC provisions contained in
I.R.C. §§ 860A-860G (1990). By the time it was introduced in Congress in 1993 the pro-
posed legislation was no longer in that form. See infra text accompanying note 198.
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ables constitute the largest portion of non-mortgage securitized assets. 160
Thus, the final legislation was a mix of the REMIC rules and other non-
statutory models.
As under the REMIC rules, FASIT status is elective, and the electing
entity must meet a number of complex qualifications. Each set of rules
impose restrictions on the kinds of assets the vehicle can hold, the activi-
ties it can engage in, the interests it can issue, and the investors who can
hold those interests. As one would expect, however, the FASIT's restric-
tions are generally looser than the REMIC's. But they are also less gen-
erous in important ways.
A FASIT, unlike a REMIC, may hold virtually any asset that qualifies
as a debt instrument under the tax law and that bears interest at a fixed or
variable (but not contingent) rate. 161 On one hand this gives the FASIT
the flexibility to securitize a large variety of instruments, including trade
receivables, car loans, home equity loans, and credit card receivables.
Plus, a FASIT has a greater ability than a REMIC to enter into contracts
or hold assets that hedge its risks. 162 On the other hand, a REMIC may
hold contingent payment debt instruments, which would be a prohibited
transaction for a FASIT. On balance, however, the FASIT structure al-
lows securitization of many more asset types than the REMIC structure
does.
The FASIT regime also provides much more flexibility to add or re-
move assets. A FASIT may receive or acquire assets at any time during
its existence. 163 Similarly, while neither a FASIT nor a REMIC can sell
assets to take advantage of price changes, the circumstances in which a
FASIT may dispose of assets are much broader than those in which a
REMIC can do so. A FASIT can dispose of assets without engaging in a
prohibited transaction in all the same circumstances as a REMIC. 64 Plus,
it can substitute one debt instrument for another, distribute a debt instru-
ment to reduce over-collateralization, dispose of assets to liquidate a class
of regular interests, and dispose of former hedges that no longer fulfill
160. At the end of the second quarter of 2002, credit card receivables backed 27.7% of
all outstanding asset-backed securities. Home equity loans (16.5%) and automobile loans
(14.4%) are the next largest categories. The Bond Market Ass'n, Asset Backed Securities
Outstanding, available at http://www.bondmarkets.com/Research/absos.shtml (last visited
on Oct. 26, 2002).
161. These debt instruments, along with certain other assets, such as cash (which in-
cludes deposit accounts) and foreclosure property, are "permitted assets" for a FASIT.
I.R.C. § 860L(c)(1) (2002). There are, however, a number of exceptions. For example, a
debt instrument issued by the holder of the ownership interest in a FASIT or any related
person generally is not a permitted asset. Id. § 860L(c)(2).
162. The FASIT must be hedging its risks of issuing "regular interests," described be-
low. See infra note 167 and accompanying text. These hedging contracts or assets may
include interest rate or currency swaps or assets that provide credit support, such as guar-
anties, sureties or letters of credit. I.R.C. § 860L(c)(1)(D) (2002).
163. The FASIT rules require no specific time period for including assets in the FASIT,
nor do they define the receipt of a permitted asset as a prohibited transaction.
164. In general, income a FASIT earns from dispositions of assets is subject to a 100%
penalty tax unless an exception applies. I.R.C. § 860L(e)(1) (2002). The circumstances




The securities that FASITs and REMICs are permitted to issue have
logical similarities and differences. Both FASITs and REMICs must have
a designated equity interest, which is an "ownership interest" in the case
of a FASIT.166 All other FASIT securities, the regular interests, must
have specific debt-like characteristics. 67 Unlike REMICs, FASITs have
a special class of regular interests, called high-yield interests, that are sub-
ject to fewer restrictions on their terms than the other regular interests, 168
but are subject to other limitations, discussed later. As in the case of
REMICs, the FASIT regular interests are debt instruments for federal
income tax purposes: holders of the regular interests accrue interest in-
come, and the FASIT owner accrues interest expense. 169 Unlike
REMICs, however, FASITs may issue securities at any time and can liq-
uidate classes of regular interests without penalty.170  Thus, while a
REMIC is a fixed pool of assets and has a limited life span, a FASIT can
continue indefinitely, much like a revolving credit facility secured by a
changing pool of assets.
The different securitization structures on which the two regimes were
modeled also explain the different ways income from the arrangements is
taken into account. While a REMIC makes entity-level calculations of
income and loss, a FASIT does not. Instead, the holder of the ownership
interest accounts for the income, deductions, and other tax items of the
FASIT directly, as if the FASIT's assets were owned, and its regular inter-
ests were issued, directly by the holder. 17' Thus, a FASIT is not even a
pass-through for this purpose-it is a non-entity. This is another example
of the way in which the FASIT rules appear to be modeled on the collat-
eralized debt securitization structure.
The link between the collateralized debt securitization structure and
the FASIT rules also illuminates one of the significant differences be-
165. I.R.C. § 860L(e)(3) (2002).
166. Id. § 860L(a)(1).
167. The regular interests must resemble plain-vanilla debt: they must have a fixed
term, be designated as a regular interest in a FASIT, unconditionally entitle the holder to a
specified principal amount, provide for interest (if any) at fixed or certain qualified varia-
ble rates, have a stated maturity of 30 years or less, have an issue price not exceeding 125%
of the principal amount, and have a yield to maturity of less than 500 basis points above the
applicable federal rate for the month in which the interest is issued. Id. § 860L(b)(1)(A).
168. The high-yield interests are not subject to the stated principal amount requirement
or the yield and issue price limitations that apply to other regular interests, and may pro-
vide for payments determined by reference to a specific and constant portion of interest
received on the FASIT's assets. Id. § 860L(b)(1)(B).
t69. Id. § 860H(b)-(c).
170. There are no restrictions under the FASIT rules on the issuance of regular inter-
ests after a specified time. I.R.C. § 860L(e)(2)(D) provides that a disposition of a FASIT's
assets to liquidate a class of regular interests, for whatever reason, is not a prohibited trans-
action. A prohibited transaction is subject to a tax of 100% of the net income from the
transaction. Id. § 860L(e)(1). A REMIC, on the other hand, may only dispose of assets in
order to redeem class of interests if there is a small remaining balance of the interests. See
supra note 141.
171. I.R.C. § 860H(b)(1) (2002).
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tween the FASIT and REMIC regimes. The FASIT rules require high-
yield regular interests and FASIT ownership interests to be held by taxa-
ble corporations. 172 Moreover, the holder's taxable income cannot be less
than the income on its FASIT interest. 173 The REMIC provisions, by
contrast, have rules that only help ensure tax will be collected on excess
inclusion income.' 74 The consequence of the FASIT rule is that a signifi-
cant portion of a FASIT's income may be subject to corporate-level tax.
The origin of this rule is easy to understand. In a collateralized debt
securitization only a portion of the yield from a pool of receivables can be
paid as interest to security holders. Because of the limit in practice on the
securities' yields, which is a function of the high credit rating needed to
obtain a tax opinion, a portion of the return from the receivables remains
in the originators' hands and can be subject to a corporate-level tax.175
Using this transaction as the starting point, the FASIT legislation allows a
greater percentage of assets in a pool to be securitized, but retains the
corporate-level tax, imposing it explicitly on holders of the high-yield and
ownership interests.
The effect of this rule, however, can be significantly harsher than sim-
ply including FASIT income in a corporate taxpayer's gross income. In a
collateralized debt securitization, the borrower may not actually pay tax
on the difference between the income on the assets and the interest on
the debt if, for example, it otherwise has losses. But an originator who
retains an ownership interest in a FASIT cannot reduce the income from
the interest the same way. This creates a strong disincentive for some
taxpayers against using the FASIT structure to securitize assets.
Moreover, the policy basis for imposing the corporate tax is not self-
evident. Although one might argue it is appropriate because high-yield
and ownership interests have "equity-like" returns, this statement cannot
withstand critical examination. An investment is not subject to entity-
level tax simply because it is risky.' 76 A return is said to be "equity-like"
because the holder bears the risks of an owner rather than a creditor, not
because he or she owns the equivalent of equity in a corporation. An
individual can own a junk bond or speculate in real estate, which can be a
172. Id. §§ 860K, 860L(a)(1)(C), (a)(2). The rules attempt to limit ownership of owner-
ship interest and high-yield debt instruments to "eligible corporations." Id.
§ 860L(a)(1)(C). The ownership interest must be held by a single, eligible corporation or
the FASIT will be disqualified. Id. An eligible corporation is a domestic corporation sub-
ject to tax under Subchapter C of Chapter 1 of Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code.
In addition, it cannot be a pass-through entity such as a regulated investment company, a
real estate mortgage investment conduit or an S corporation. Id. § 860L(a)(2). A high-
yield interest may also be held by another FASIT. A transfer of a high-yield interest to any
person who is ineligible to hold it is ignored for tax purposes and the transferor is subject
to tax as if it continued to hold the interest. Id. § 860K.
173. Id. § 860J(a).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 146-47.
175. See supra text accompanying note 127.
176. Cf. Gergen, supra note 85, at 51 (making a similar argument about equating risk
with an active business for purposes of defining an active financing business under the
publicly traded partnership rules).
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very risky investment and can pay a very high return, without being
treated as owning corporate stock or being subject to the corporate tax
on the income. 177
But if corporate tax were not imposed on the income from the high-
yield and ownership interests, the returns on assets securitized in a FASIT
would be removed from the corporate tax base. Could this create alloca-
tive inefficiencies by increasing the after-tax returns to investments in
these assets relative to the returns on other investments? It might, but it
is worth observing that diversified investments in many other types of
assets can be made through publicly traded vehicles that are not subject
to entity-level tax. For example, notes and bonds and other financial con-
tracts can be owned through mutual funds, long-term debt can be owned
through grantor trusts, and real estate assets can be owned through real
estate investment trusts and REMICs. The holder of a FASIT high-yield
or ownership interest is making an essentially passive investment: at most
these investors provide credit support for the regular interest class. 178
Equality of treatment would seem to argue against imposing the corpo-
rate tax on income from these investments. 179
The absence of a compelling policy justification for the rule imposing
corporate tax on FASIT income is clearer when it is compared to the
REMIC excess inclusion rule.180 If there were no excess inclusion rule,
taxpayers could more easily utilize a strategy of allocating taxable income
to an exempt person without also allocating the corresponding economic
income. This strategy would remove the net present value of the phan-
tom income, or more,'181 from the tax base even if the related economic
177. An issuer of an interest bearing a high yield, however, may lose the interest deduc-
tion under the high yield debt obligation rules of I.R.C. § 163(e)(5) (2002).
178. Some worry that failing to impose the corporate level tax on at least some portion
of a FASIT's income would allow financial institutions to escape corporate level tax by
siphoning off income to a related FASIT. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Bank Deregulation
Through the Back Door, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 178-6 (1995). This concern is not without
merit, but it seems that limiting FASIT assets to debt instruments with fixed (or certain
variable) rates of interest should control this potential. Merely running what would other-
wise be debt through a "funnel" should not convert some portion of that debt into equity.
PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 15, at 119. Nonetheless, a financial institution might
work around this requirement by allowing the FASIT to retain the institution's fee income,
the interest rate spread it enjoys, so that the institution's equity interests could be con-
verted into debt instruments and its corporate level tax could be wiped out. Alternatively,
an originator operating as a partnership might use the FASIT regime as a method of avoid-
ing publicly traded partnership status under I.R.C. § 7704 (2002) by using what are essen-
tially equity investments in the FASIT to finance its activities. To fully respond to these
concerns one must address the policy justifications for a corporate level tax and whether
the FASIT or REMIC regime might be an acceptable means of corporate tax integration.
That discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
179. Cf. Letter from Donald B. Susswein, of Thatcher, Profit, and Wood, to Mr. Daven-
port, Editor, Tax Notes (Sept. 13, 1995), reprinted in FASIT Lawyer Takes Sheppard To
School, 95 TAX NOTEs TODAY 185-111 (1995) ("The principal group of loans excluded
from. . . passthrough treatment are short-term or revolving loans whose duration is too
short (or too uncertain) for a 'static' pass-through structure.").
180. I.R.C. § 860E (2002).
181. The result is even worse if phantom losses can be allocated to taxpayers who can
use them against other income. Losses on REMIC ownership interests are only deductible
2003]
SMU LAW REVIEW
income had been earned by a taxable entity. The REMIC excess inclu-
sion rules attempt to limit the tax savings obtained through this strategy.
The same purpose cannot be ascribed, however, to the imposition of cor-
porate tax on all income accruing on high-yield and ownership interests in
a FASIT.
The REMIC rules do not subject any portion of the income from mort-
gages held by a REMIC to a corporate-level tax. Furthermore, they do
not explicitly impose corporate tax on the returns to any REMIC securi-
ties, even though the REMIC securities that represent interest strips can
be very risky and may bear high interest rates.18 2 The inconsistency be-
tween the REMIC rules and the FASIT provisions looks suspiciously like
a historical accident rather than a policy choice; 183 the accident being that
the secondary market for mortgages developed earlier and more com-
pletely than did secondary markets for other cash-flow assets.' 84 By the
time the REMIC rules were enacted the returns on mortgages had al-
ready exited the corporate tax base.' 8 5 The REMIC rules just help them
exit more efficiently.
These criticisms may be answered by arguing that the imposition of the
corporate tax under the FASIT rules is appropriate because the FASIT
legislation was not really intended to reduce the tax costs of securitizing
assets, but to reduce transaction costs by providing certainty of tax treat-
ment. 8 6 This argument seems hollow. But even if accepted at face value,
the additional rules necessary to insure collection of the corporate-level
tax on the high-yield debt and ownership interests, together with the rule
that terminates FASIT status if the ownership interest is not held by a
taxable corporation 87 would seem to undo a good deal of whatever cer-
to the extent of the holder's basis. Id. § 860C(e)(2). Presumably a taxpayer can use phan-
tom losses to defer income by purchasing an ownership interest that has economic value
right at the time the REMIC starts to generate losses, or by engaging in a transaction that
increases his basis in the REMIC residual interest.
182. PEASLEE & NIRENIIERG, supra note 15, at 454-55 Peaslee and Nirenberg believe
the specified fixed portion of interest payments rule was added to the REMIC provisions
in 1988 because policymakers thought it would not allow a REMIC to accomplish anything
that could not be done through a grantor trust. A FASIT, however, would probably not be
able to achieve the effect in another form.
183. The especially favorable treatment of mortgage securitizations could also be attrib-
utable to the importance of mortgage lending in this country. Cf. id. at 36 (postulating that
the REMIC legislation went forward in such a narrow form because home loans "have
traditionally benefited from Congressional largesse").
184. For an excellent description of the development of the asset-backed security mar-
ket, see Proposal to Expand REMIC Provisions, supra note 28, at 302-07.
185. Although the mortgages could not be securitized in a multi-class structure without
a potential corporate-level tax after the promulgation of the Sears regulations and before
the enactment of the REMIC rules, see supra notes 80-82, an originator who used a simpler
structure could sell its entire interest in the mortgages in the secondary market.
186. See, e.g., Extended Statement of Rep. Shaw on Introduction of Securitization En-
hancement Act, supra note 36, at El 369; Report on the Small Business Job Protection Act
of 1996, S. RDi. No. 281, 104th Cong., at 125-33; Conference Report on the Small Business
Job Protection Act of 1996, H.R. CONF. REPT. No. 737, 104th Cong., at 320-29.
187. I.R.C. §§ 860K, 860L(a)(1)(B) (2002). The FASIT analogue to the REMIC excess
inclusion provision of I.R.C. § 860E (2002) is somewhat simpler because it does not require
a calculation of the excess inclusion amount. It provides that the taxable income of a
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tainty otherwise flows from the FASIT rules. 188
While imposing corporate tax on income from FASIT high-yield and
ownership interests is understandable because of its consistency with the
transactional blueprint for the FASIT legislation, the rules that govern
transfers of securitized assets to a FASIT are a clear break from that
model. The rules require the holder of the ownership interest to recog-
nize gain (but not loss) on contributions of property to the FASIT.189
The rules are entirely inconsistent with the collateralized debt securitiza-
tion paradigm, which allows all proceeds from the transaction to be re-
ceived without recognition of gain or loss. Moreover, they are
substantially more burdensome than the REMIC rules, which require
recognition of gain or loss on contributed assets only when interests rep-
resenting those assets are sold. 190 A taxpayer that originates receivables
and transfers them to a FASIT recognizes gain immediately, even if the
taxpayer sells none of the FASIT interests.
An early report states that the FASIT legislation was intended "to
strike the same 'bargain' between the Treasury and the securitization in-
dustry that the REMIC legislation struck, namely the waiver ... of debt/
equity testing on securitization in exchange for immediate recognition of
gain" and the current taxation of phantom income. 191 But the industry
seems to have come out on the short end of that bargain. The FASIT
gain recognition rules effectively accelerate income much more than the
REMIC rules do. Not only that, they use a special valuation rule for debt
instruments that are not traded on an established securities market that
causes an overly high fair market value to be ascribed to the assets trans-
ferred to a FASIT.1 92 Finally, to prevent taxpayers from trying to avoid
gain recognition by keeping assets out of the FASIT, the rules require the
holder of an ownership interest to recognize gains on any assets not held
by the FASIT that "support" payments on FASIT regular interests. 193
holder of a high-yield or ownership interest cannot be less than its share of FASIT income.
Id. § 860J(a).
188. One could rightly ask why the legislation did not simply impose tax on the FASIT
itself. If an SPV is subject to significant potential for liability it may not obtain a desirable
level of "bankruptcy remoteness" and thus would not be able to obtain the high credit
rating that is the purpose, or one of the main purposes of engaging in the transaction in the
first place. If another party bears primary liability for tax on the income of the entity this
issue does not arise.
189. Id. § 8601(a).
190. Id. § 860F(b). See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
191. Letter from N. Jerold Cohen, Chair, Section of Tax'n, Am. Bar Ass'n, to Kenneth
Kies, Chief of Staff, J. Comm. on Tax'n (Aug. 12, 1995), reprinted in ABA Tax Section
Members Offer Mixed Support on 'FASIT' Bill, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 167-14 (1995).
192. I.R.C. § 8601(d) (2002). The value of such an asset is the present value of its rea-
sonably expected payments, using a discount rate equal to 120% of the Applicable Federal
Rate, defined in I.R.C. § 1274 (2002), unless regulations provide otherwise. Proposed Reg-
ulations issued under this section to date have provided no meaningful exceptions to this
rule, but do provide other discount rates. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.8601-2, 65 Fed. Reg.
5807 (Feb. 7, 2000).
193. I.R.C. § 8601(b) (2002).
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There are three principal factors that make immediate gain recognition
problematic. First, originators often contribute assets to an SPV some
time before the SPV's interests are sold to other investors. 194 Thus, the
FASIT gain recognition rule substantially accelerates income relative to
simply holding the assets.' 95 Second, originators in non-mortgage loan
securitizations, and especially originators of securitized credit card receiv-
ables, often retain relatively large interests in the receivables. In credit
card securitizations in particular, the originator must provide a cushion so
investors' interests do not amortize prematurely.1 96 Again, the gain rec-
ognition rule marks contributed assets to the higher of basis or market,
even though, in a sense, the originator retains the portion of the assets
measured by its percentage interest in the pool. Finally, the mandated
discount rate for valuation is too low in many cases, and results not only
in inclusion of previously accrued economic gain, but also artificial
gain.1 97 These problems translate into a significant disincentive for many
originators to use the FASIT structure at all.
The gain recognition requirement and its associated rules may be an
appropriate way to undo some of the vagaries of our realization system.
It may also be a response to legitimate concerns about income shifting.
Even so, technical budgetary concerns played a critical role in the devel-
opment of the FASIT legislation and the adoption of the gain recognition
requirement and associated rules. Representative Clay Shaw, sponsor of
the 1995 FASIT legislation,1 98 touted its ability to raise revenue through
requiring gain recognition. According to his statement accompanying in-
troduction of the bill, the FASIT legislation would raise $87 million over
five years and $92 million over ten by replacing amounts lost to the cor-
194. A sponsor often transfers all of the receivables of a certain type that it originates
over time to a master trust. This is done to avoid accounting complexities and to allow the
accounts associated with receivables to establish a performance history. See Letter from
Richard L. Reinhold, Chair, Section of Tax'n, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, to Hon. Donald C.
Lubick, Acting Assistant Sec'y, Dep't of Treasury, and Margaret M. Richardson, Comm'r,
IRS (Feb. 7, 1997), reprinted in NY Bar Suggests FASIT Rules, 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 28-
27 (1997) [hereinafter Letter from Richard L. Reinhold].
195. Whether or not mortgage loans are transferred in advance to a REMIC is of little
consequence, since a transferor of assets to a REMIC in exchange for REMIC interests
recognizes income or loss only upon the disposition of the assets. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 150-54.
196. See supra text accompanying note 125.
197. See, e.g., Letter from James M. Peaslee to Paul Crispino, Treasury Dep't (July 29,
1998), reprinted in Peaslee Follows up on FASIT Regs' Meeting, 98 TAX NOTEs TODAY 205-
15 (1998) ("[T]he 120% of AFR rule can significantly distort the value of debt instruments
in a way that makes the FASIT rules unusable where it applies, particularly in the case of
medium or long-term debt obligations."); Letter from Richard L. Reinhold, supra note
194; Letter from George P. Miller, Bond Market Association, to the IRS (May 19, 2000),
reprinted in Bond Association Suggests Changes to Proposed FASIT Regs., 2000 TAX
NOTES TODAY 116-44 (2000).
198. H.R. 1967, 104th Cong. (1995). This bill did not contain the same gain on transfer
rule applied under I.R.C. § 8601(d) (2002). Rather, it would have accelerated income only
to the extent a person who transferred assets to a FASIT sold some or all of the securities
received in exchange at a gain.
[Vol. 56
FIXING FASITs
porate tax basis with gain recognition. 199 But he also said that the bill
would not increase taxes,200 which seems at odds with the revenue esti-
mate. Both of these statements can be true, however, if the revenue gen-
erated by accelerated gain is temporary. Thus, when the creation of
FASITs and issuance of FASIT interests stabilized, revenue generated by
the accelerated income would be offset by deductions for bond premi-
ums. The relatively small amount of revenue the legislation would have
raised in years five-through-ten ($87 million in the first five years, $5 mil-
lion in the second) supports this hypothesis.
Nonetheless, gain acceleration allowed the legislation to be scored as a
revenue raiser, which in turn made it much more likely to be enacted.
Under recently expired congressional budget rules, a provision that loses
revenue generally must be accompanied by a proposal that provides a
revenue offset.20 Whether a tax provision raises or loses revenue over
the relevant period is determined by revenue estimates performed by
economists at the Joint Committee on Taxation. This stage of the journey
to enactment is so critical that many proposals are crafted specifically
with the revenue estimate in mind.202 When groups advocate new tax
provisions that will reduce revenues, they not only have the burden of
justifying the revenue reduction on policy grounds, but often must also
supply an acceptable method to raise the offsetting revenue. The di-
lemma is that proponents of other costly proposals are also on the look-
out for "pay-fors" and will compete viciously for those that appear to be
politically acceptable.20 3
The original FASIT gain recognition rule was intended to ease passage
of the legislation by making it a desirable source of revenue for other
proposals. This strategy, however, backfired by rendering it untenable
for FASIT legislation to go forward on any basis other than as a revenue-
raising provision. As it became clearer that the FASIT rules would pro-
vide opportunities to shift income, the legislation became increasingly
complex to foreclose the opportunities and protect the revenue to be
raised. This complexity ultimately collapsed on itself and resulted in the
199. See Extended Statement of Rep. Shaw on Introduction of Securitization Enhance-
ment Act, supra note 39, at E1369, E1371.
200. Id. at E1369.
201. See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
177, 99 Stat. 1037, 1038, amended by Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754, amended by Budget En-
forcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (codified as amended at 2
U.S.C.A. §§ 901-09, 921-22 (West Supp. 1990)). The Senate is operating under a continua-
tion of the budget rules until April 15, 2003, pursuant to a resolution that received unani-
mous consent. Sen. Res. 304, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted).
202. For example, phase-in and transition rules are often adopted to help achieve a
certain revenue goal.
203. It is not uncommon for proponents of one legislative proposal to steal a revenue
raising provision identified by advocates of a different legislative proposal. Among Con-
gressional staffers this is called being "Guarinied" after former House Ways and Means
Committee member Frank J. Guarini of New Jersey. See, e.g., Ryan J. Donmoyer, Houdini
Bests Guarini As Pay-For Disappears, 99 TAX NOTES TODAY 162-1 (1999).
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final legislation. This can be seen by tracing the development of the
FASIT legislation.
The American Bar Association made the first formal and well-devel-
oped proposal to expand statutory securitization vehicles after 1986.204
The group called its vehicle an asset securitization investment conduit
("ASIC"). The ASIC proposal retained almost all the REMIC rules, but
extended them so that non-mortgage assets could be securitized and that
revolving or short-term assets could move into the vehicle and revolving
assets could move out more freely. As under the REMIC provisions, a
person transferring assets in exchange for ASIC interests would recognize
no gain or loss on the exchange, and its basis in the ASIC interests would
be the same as its basis in the property contributed. To ensure the con-
tributor would have the same income from a continuing interest in the
ASIC as it would have had if it had retained the assets, the ASIC rules,
like the REMIC rules, would have required the transferor to accrue un-
recognized gain or loss as if they were market discount or amortizable
bond premium on the retained ASIC interests. 205 In addition, since the
basis of the ASIC interests would be the same as the transferor's aggre-
gate basis in the assets transferred in exchange, the transferor would rec-
ognize gain or loss as the interests were sold.
This approach would have worked fairly well for a static pool of assets,
but was not fully formed when it came to revolving securitizations. For
example, it left open the opportunity for the originator to recognize loss
on receivables simply by selling them to the ASIC. Similarly, an origina-
tor could have recognized or deferred gain or loss by rearranging the or-
der in which the ASIC received assets and issued interests: an originator
who wanted to recognize losses could exchange receivables with built-in
loss for interests that it would sell, and only later transfer assets with
built-in gain to the ASIC. Contributing assets at different times for dif-
ferent consideration also could allow transferors to obtain significant in-
come deferral if the assets supported ASIC interests having significantly
longer maturities, as they would, for example, in a credit card securitiza-
tion. The proposal would also have allowed multiple holders of owner-
ship interests to shift income among themselves by contributing assets
with different basis-to-value ratios. 20 6 Thus, the proposal created signifi-
cant opportunities for taxpayers to accelerate losses, defer gains, and shift
income.
204. See generally Proposal to Expand REMIC Provisions, supra note 28.
205. This is the same rule that applies to transferors of assets to REMIC. See supra
note 152. Thus, the discount and premium rules would cause an ASIC's income on assets
with built-in gain to be lower than it would have been in the transferor's hands, and its
income on assets with built-in loss to be higher. The special accrual rule for the trans-
feror's unrecognized gains and losses was an attempt to undo this result when the trans-
feror retains an interest in the assets by holding ASIC securities.
206. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, How Many Owners Can a FASIT Have?, 97 TAX




When the first legislation was introduced in 1993, the bill was signifi-
cantly different than the original proposal. Instead of piggybacking on
the existing REMIC rules, H.R. 2065 created an entirely new vehicle and
called it a FASIT.20 7 But in many respects the legislation still closely
tracked the REMIC provisions. It provided that gain or loss would be
recognized upon the transfer of assets to a FASIT, that the basis in a
FASIT interest received by a transferor would be equal to its fair market
value at the time of transfer, and that the FASIT would have a basis in
the received assets equal to their fair market value. Gain or loss recog-
nized on the transfer would be deferred, however, to the extent interests
were retained, and would be taken into account as if the gains were mar-
ket discount and the losses were bond premium on the transferred assets
(rather than on the received interests). Since the transferor received the
interests with a fair market value basis, no gain or loss would be recog-
nized on their immediate sale. However, the bill contained a special rule
that required the transferor to treat any sale proceeds as pro-rata pay-
ments on the principal of the outstanding assets held by the FASIT. This
would accelerate the recognition of a pro-rata portion of the notional
market discount income or bond premium deduction to the transferor.
Although this regime was more sophisticated than the ASIC proposal,
it still left gaping holes. Again, it failed to prevent taxpayers from elect-
ing between deferral and recognition simply by choosing the form of the
transaction in which assets are transferred to the FASIT. While in theory
it did a better job of ensuring a transferor that had a continuing interest
in the FASIT would recognize gain or loss in a manner approximating the
income or deductions it would have had if it had retained the assets, it
also set up a mechanism that required taxpayers or the IRS to track spe-
cific assets contributed to the FASIT by the transferor. Using this mecha-
nism would have been unworkable for revolving trusts that could hold
millions or billions of dollars worth of receivables.
The Securitization Enhancement Act of 1995208 was even more com-
plex in its efforts to prevent loss acceleration, income deferral, and in-
come shifting.209 Under this proposal, no gain or loss would be
recognized on contribution of assets if the transferor held an ownership
207. H.R. 2065, 104th Cong. (1993). See also Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Description of
Miscellaneous Tax Proposals, JCS-8-93, at 10-20 (Comm. Print 1993), reprinted in JCT Is-
sues Report on Miscellaneous Tax Proposals, 93 TAX NOTES TODAY 128-8 (1993); Suss-
wein, supra note 127.
208. H.R. 1967, 104th Cong. (1995).
209. An even more complicated set of rules had been proposed at the end of 1993. See
NYSBA Reports on Proposed "FASIT" Legislation, supra note 10. The proposal was much
like its successor, H.R. 1967, but more complex. For example, it had an elaborate scheme
requiring holders of ownership interests to reallocate basis among various FASIT securities
before a sale to prevent loss cherry-picking. The proposal also required a holder of an
ownership interest to take into account as income or deduction its share of the difference
between its outside basis in the FASIT interests and the FASIT's aggregate basis in its
assets, and to recognize gain to the extent that its interest in the FASIT's assets declined by
reason of the issuance of FASIT regular interests.
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interest in the FASIT after the transfer.2t The transferor would take a
substituted basis in its FASIT ownership interests,2t 1 and the FASIT
would have a carryover basis in contributed assets. The proposal required
the holder of an ownership interest to treat all receipts of cash from the
FASIT as distributions on the interest rather than as payment for assets
transferred to the FASIT. Thus, the transferor could not use the FASIT
to trigger loss recognition without disposing of a significant amount of
FASIT securities. 212 The bill also would have required the holder of an
ownership interest to recognize gain to the extent of any decline in its
proportionate share of the built-in gain on FASIT assets, taking into ac-
count the extent to which the FASIT was leveraged by regular inter-
ests. 21 3 The legislation also contained rules against adding assets to
manipulate recognized income, and generally would have followed a
partnership model to track income and loss allocations to transferors who
contributed assets with different built-in gains and losses.214
These rules did a much better job of policing the problems identified
with the early FASIT proposal. But they also required frequent valua-
tions of FASIT assets, which would have been administratively burden-
some and potentially unreliable.
Finally, in late 1995 Congress abandoned the effort to provide deferral
of gain or loss on assets transferred to a FASIT, and provided for immedi-
ate gain recognition in all events.2 15 The legislation also provided a valu-
ation rule, a rule requiring gain recognition on supporting assets, and the
requirement that a FASIT's ownership interest be held by a single taxable
210. The legislation would, however, have applied the partnership disguised sale rules
of I.R.C. §§ 707(a)(2)(B), 737 (2002) to transfers to and distributions from a FASIT.
211. The receipt of a FASIT regular interest by a holder of an ownership interest would
be treated as an issuance of the interest for cash and a distribution of the cash to the holder
of the ownership interest. This could give rise to immediate gain recognition if the trans-
feror's basis in its ownership interest was less than the fair market value of the FASIT
regular interests distributed in the exchange.
212. Since distributions of cash from the FASIT would have been treated as a recovery
of basis in the FASIT ownership interest, no loss could be recognized and gain might be
recognized upon receipt of a cash distribution.
213. This would have been determined by multiplying the unrealized gain on assets
held by the FASIT by the FASIT's leverage ratio. Thus, as a FASIT increased its leverage,
the holder would recognize gain. Similarly, if leverage remained the same, but assets ap-
preciated, the holder would recognize gain. A corresponding deduction would have been
allowed for reductions in the leverage ratio or decreases in the built-in appreciation in the
FASIT's assets.
214. The legislation referenced the rules that apply to partners under I.R.C. § 704(c)
(2002) to police allocation between owners. It also would have subjected contributions to
the investment partnership rules of I.R.C. § 721 (2002).
215. Balanced Budget Reconciliation Act of 1995, S. 1357, 104th Cong. § 12,851 (1995);
Balanced Budget Reconciliation Act of 1995, H.R. 2491, 104th Cong. § 11,351 (1995); See
also Comm. on Ways & Means, U.S. House of Representatives, and Comm. on Fin., U.S.
Senate, and Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Corporate and Other Reforms and Miscellaneous Provi-
sions (Nov. 16, 1995), reprinted in Conference Report Explanation; Revenue Reconciliation
Act Title XI, Part IX-Corporate and Other Reforms and Miscellaneous Provisions, 95 TAX
NOTEs TODAY 225-10 (1995). The later legislation also jettisoned a special exception con-
tained in H.R. 1967 that would have allowed originators, under certain circumstances, to
reduce their FASIT income by net operating losses.
[Vol. 56
FIXING FASITs
corporation. This legislation was very similar in these regards to the
FASIT legislation that was eventually enacted.
The statute contemplated that regulations would allow gain deferral,
reduce discrepancies between the FASIT valuation and fair market value
of contributed assets, and permit more than one member of an affiliated
group of corporations to hold a FASIT's ownership interests. But Con-
gress sent a profoundly mixed message to the bureaucrats responsible for
crafting those regulations. On the one hand, legislative history suggests
that securitization should be encouraged by simplifying the tax rules that
apply to securitizations and to make those rules more clear and their ap-
plication more certain.216 But when faced with a conflict between clear,
simple rules that would encourage securitizations but cost revenue, on the
one hand, and clear, simple rules that would allow the FASIT legislation
to retain its status as a revenue raiser, on the other, Congress chose the
latter path.
In light of this, regulators have no good choices. They could design
taxpayer-friendly rules to allow gain deferral, multiple owners, and more
lenient valuation of transferred assets, but doing so would likely reduce
revenue collections, which Congress indicated should not be sacrificed for
simplicity's sake. Alternatively, they could design highly complex rules to
protect revenues, but at the risk of doing little or nothing that would
make the FASIT structure more useful. 217 Finally, regulators might
choose to do nothing, on the one hand protecting revenue and on the
other doing little to reduce tax impediments to securitization. Since the
two latter options have essentially the same effect, why would anyone
choose to invest resources in drafting essentially useless, complex rules?
Congress so effectively communicated the revenue considerations that
regulators so far have tried to avoid adopting rules that have any risk of
reducing revenues.
216. See, e.g., Description of Miscellaneous Tax Proposals, supra note 207, at 15; Ex-
tended Statement of Rep. Shaw on Introduction of Securitization Enhancement Act, supra
note 39, at E1369-E1371; 1996 Blue Book, supra note 46, at 258-59.
217. For example, the preamble to the 2000 proposed FASIT regulations say:
Commentators urged the IRS and Treasury to issue guidance that would
change the statutory rule and permit members of a consolidated group to
jointly hold a FASIT ownership interest. In studying the issue, however, the
IRS and Treasury became concerned about how such guidance would con-
tinue to satisfy those general principles of the consolidated return regulations
that preclude the shifting of stock basis, income, or loss. The IRS and Trea-
sury considered different models that would permit members of a consoli-
dated group to jointly hold (or enjoy the benefits of jointly holding) a FASIT
ownership interest, but none of these were found to adequately address the
government's concerns without adding administrative complexity for both
the IRS and taxpayers. Moreover, the IRS and Treasury are not convinced
the level of potential attribute shifting should be disregarded or addressed
through an anti-abuse rule or would be so minor that disregarding it would
be appropriate.




In retrospect, promoting the FASIT legislation as a revenue raiser was
a strategic mistake. On the other hand, it seems unlikely Congress would
have enacted the provisions if they had appeared to lose revenue within
the budget window. The more important question is whether, in the ab-
sence of budget constraints, they nonetheless should have been enacted.
The arguments that securitization is an improvement over other meth-
ods of raising capital, and so improves capital market efficiency, are
somewhat persuasive, even if not supported by significant empirical evi-
dence. To the extent securitization allows risk to be segmented and
spread, creates a market for otherwise illiquid assets, allows investors to
better tailor their own risk exposures, and reduces agency costs associ-
ated with corporate borrowing, it is an economically beneficial activity.
Thus, in theory securitization should not be structurally disadvantaged
versus other methods of raising capital.
The costs of providing a workable regime for non-mortgage securitiza-
tions, however, may be high, both in revenue and in complexity, espe-
cially considering that non-statutory structures are relatively well
developed and accepted. On the other hand, the other statutory vehicles
for pooling financial assets are highly successful. This suggests that these
vehicles create significant efficiencies.
The toll charges an originator incurs when creating a FASIT must be
reduced if FASITs are to become a viable securitization vehicle. The ne-
cessity of this step is self-evident: Virtually no securitizations are cur-
rently being structured as FASITs. Reducing the toll charges would have
two elements: easing the rules that mandate payment corporate-level tax
on income from ownership and high-yield regular interests, and mitigat-
ing the effect of immediate gain recognition on the transferor of assets to
a FASIT.
As a matter of policy, there is no obvious reason to impose a corporate-
level tax on FASIT income. This element of the legislation was clearly
motivated by revenue considerations. It is also clearly the easiest flaw in
the FASIT provisions to solve. Presumably, however, the rules that im-
pose corporate tax on income from ownership and high-yield regular in-
terests would need to be replaced with a provision analogous to the
REMIC excess inclusion rules to insure that phantom income could not
be allocated to an accommodation party.2 18 While the REMIC excess
218. It is not clear that rules identical to those contained in the REMIC rules would be
necessary. The REMIC structure allows long-term mortgages to be stripped into interests
with various maturities, most of which are shorter than the maturities of the mortgages.
This back-loads income to the regular interest holders relative to the obligors on the under-
lying mortgages. Without the excess inclusion rules, a portion of interest that is deductible
to the borrowers under the mortgages would not be included income by any taxpayer. See
supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text. If, on the other hand, the debt instruments
securitized through a FASIT have shorter maturities than do the instruments used to mon-
etize them, the interest accrued on the instruments will be front-loaded compared to the
interest on the securitized debt. The tax deductibility of home mortgage interest may have
also been a motivating factor behind the excess inclusion rules. One cannot make a gener-
alization about the deductibility of interest on debt instruments that could be held by a
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inclusion provisions are complex and controversial themselves, they ap-
parently prove less of an impediment to the formation of REMICs than
the imposition of a corporate-level tax on a portion of a FASIT's income.
The other significant element of the toll charge, the recognition of in-
come on transfer of assets to a FASIT, is a thornier problem. Taking a
realization-based income tax as the given, there are no necessarily correct
policy answers and no adequate ways to assure tax neutrality between a
FASIT and other economically similar transactions. If the appropriate
analogy for a FASIT is a secured borrowing, then gain or loss on securi-
tized receivables should be recognized only as the originator accrues in-
come from the receivables and deductions from the FASIT interests.
Alternatively, if the appropriate model is the REMIC structure, an origi-
nator of receivables should recognize gain or loss as interests in the cash
flows from the receivables are "sold" to other investors. Neither of these
approaches seems more theoretically correct in the abstract.
From a more practical perspective, however, a REMIC-like approach
creates problems the other might not. The income or loss an originator
recognizes on the sale of a REMIC interest is roughly equivalent to the
income or loss the originator would have recognized had it sold a propor-
tionate share of the assets contributed to the REMIC. 21 9 The equiva-
lence does not hold if a pool of securitized assets can change or the
securitization vehicle can issue new interests. A rule that required an
originator to recognize gain on the sale of FASIT interests would fail to
account for gains and losses on assets subsequently transferred to the
FASIT to replace matured assets, and would allow originators to manage
their gains and losses by making strategic contributions of assets and
causing the FASIT to issue new interests. 220 Measuring gain or loss for
each asset each time the originator sold FASIT interests or the FASIT
issued interests would require elaborate, costly, and perhaps manipulable
accounting. In addition, either of these methods require an ancillary set
of rules for calculating the income the originator should accrue on the
ownership interest-i.e., the income on the "unsold" portion of the
receivables. 22'
FASIT, although at least in the case of credit card securitizations the interest would often
not be deductible. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(1), (h)(2)(D), (h)(3) (2002) (no deduction for per-
sonal interest; qualified residence interest excepted).
219. This is because REMIC assets and interests are static: Generally speaking, a
REMIC may not acquire new assets once it commences activities, nor may it issue new
interests.
220. See supra text preceding note 206.
221. The REMIC rules provide that the REMIC has a fair market value basis in the
assets it receives from the holder of an ownership interest. Thus, for example, if an origi-
nator transfers appreciated assets to a REMIC, the REMIC will accrue less income than
the originator would have because the assets have a higher basis in the REMIC's hands.
This is only a problem to the extent that the originator has not recognized income upon
disposing of interests in the REMIC. To address this problem the REMIC rules require
the originator to accrue as income the excess the value of the REMIC interests the origina-
tor holds over the originator's basis in those interests. I.R.C. § 860F(b)(1)(C) (2002). This
accounts for the difference between the income the originator would have accrued on the
portion of the assets that have not been "sold" and the income the REMIC accrues on
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None of these problems arise, however, under a secured financing
model because the originator continues to accrue income on securitized
assets as if nothing had changed. This requires no special rule for mea-
suring gain or loss on the sale of FASIT interests (the proceeds would
generally be treated as borrowed funds), and no adjustment in the accru-
als on the FASIT's assets to account for the recognized gain or loss.
An immediate gain recognition requirement is appealing not because it
replicates the treatment of an analogous transaction, 22 2 but because it
helps prevent taxpayers from deferring pre-contribution built-in gains.
The effect of such a rule, however, is to preclude many from using the
structure at all.223
The fact that a revolving pool of assets presents different problems
than a static pool of assets suggests that perhaps each requires a different
approach. One option would be to expand the REMIC provisions be-
yond real estate mortgage loans to cover securitization of other long-term
debt. A collateralized debt securitization model (i.e., with no gain recog-
nition on creation or sale of regular interests) could be reserved for re-
ceivables that could not be usefully securitized through a static pool.
The problem with this approach, however, is that it seems unlikely orig-
inators would use the REMIC model if the alternative did not require the
originator to recognize gain on the sale of interests. Although the result
would be a deferral of gain recognition relative to the current rules, it is
not clear why this is necessarily an unacceptable result.
The effect of such a regime would be to create a form of safe-harbor
debt for securitizations. Under either the REMIC or collateralized debt
regimes instruments with certain features 224 would qualify as debt for tax
purposes regardless of their form. If the collateralized debt model were
those assets. This method, tracking the difference between the value and basis of the
interests retained by the originator, would not work well if the interests represented a
constantly changing pool of assets, and could allow the originator to defer income relative
to simply retaining the assets. See supra text preceding note 206. The alternative of track-
ing the difference at the FASIT asset level, rather than at the FASIT interest level, would
probably be unworkable. The other alternative, giving the FASIT a carryover basis in the
assets it receives as contributions would create the opposite problem: it would overstate
the income to the holder of the ownership interests to the extent the originator recognized
gain on the sale of FASIT interests. Efforts to adjust FASIT net income to take these gains
into account would suffer the same infirmities as regimes to adjust understated income.
222. Securitizations are sometimes analogized to factoring, although there are many
distinctions between the transactions. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 27, § 1:4 at 1-12 to 1-15.
An originator would recognize gain in a factoring transaction (i.e., a sale of receivables to a
factor), but would also recognize losses. It is, however, understandable that the FASIT
rules do not permit immediate recognition of loss-that would allow an originator to elect
to recognize losses simply by creating an FASIT and contributing assets to it.
223. It also help prevent income shifting between transferors of assets to a FASIT.
224. Both the FASIT rules and the REMIC rules restrict the terms of instruments that
qualify for debt treatment: regular interests must entitle the holder to a specified principal
or similar amount and bear only certain types of interest. I.R.C. §§ 860G(a)(1),
860L(b)(1)(A) (2002). The FASIT rules contain a second restriction: To avoid being classi-
fied as a high-yield regular interest, an instrument must have a yield below a certain level
and be restricted in other ways. Id. § 860L(b)(1)(B). These restrictions would be less rele-
vant if FASIT income were not subject to a corporate-level tax.
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followed, the entity holding the securities would -be ignored for tax pur-
poses and the holder of a residual interest would be treated as the owner
of the assets. If REMIC model were followed the entity holding the se-
curities would be treated more like a partnership. 225
There undoubtedly would be many complexities attendant on this ap-
proach taxing securitization transactions. For example, when would tax
policy concerns necessitate the existence of an ownership or residual in-
terest in the securitized assets and what would determine the line be-
tween a regular interest and an ownership or residual interest? Could
there be more than one holder of an ownership or residual interest?
What would be the tax consequences of a transfer or sale of such an inter-
est? Should the treatment only apply to securitizations of debt, or should
it apply more broadly?226 Should it somehow be made the exclusive tax
vehicle available for securitizations? 227
The significant benefit of a safe-harbor debt approach is that it would
be flexible. It would not be limited to a historical transactional model but
would be able to accommodate innovative structures. It would also re-
duce the number of special purpose vehicles in the tax code. This would
reduce the complexity of the tax code itself. More importantly, however,
such an approach would reduce the tax complexity associated with securi-
tizing assets by providing a relatively simple and consistent template for
structuring transactions.
As a preliminary matter it seems clear that a single safe-harbor debt
regime would be superior to the combination of the REMIC and FASIT
rules. Like any other meaningful simplification, however, adopting a use-
ful safe-harbor debt approach to securitization would probably be scored
as losing significant revenue because it would increase corporate interest
deductions. More importantly for our purposes, however, the transition
from the current rules, particularly in the REMIC area, to a new regime
would be complex and costly.
One might also ask if enacting a safe-harbor debt regime would be sub-
stantially better than simply repealing the FASIT rules and letting taxpay-
ers rely on other methods of securitizing debt. In practice it may not be.
225. The partnership structure has the benefit of allowing multiple holders of owner-
ship interests, but also creates opportunities for income shifting between them. Many au-
thors have commented on the use of partnerships to shift income between partners. For a
small sample, see, e.g., Gergen, supra note 85, at 53-60; Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Sub-
chapter K: Contributions and Distributions, 47 TAx L. REV. 173 (1991); Laura E. Cunning-
ham & Noel B. Cunningham, Simplifying Subchapter K: The Deferred Sale Method, 51
SMU L. REV. 1, 2 (1997); George K. Yin, The Future Taxation of Private Business Firms, 4
FLA. TAX REV. 141, 142 (1999). This was a concern in the formulation of the FASIT legis-
lation and the subsequent promulgation of regulations. See, e.g., supra note 217.
226. The safe harbor debt treatment might apply more broadly but be limited to non-
recourse arrangements. How non-recourse arrangements might be defined for this pur-
pose is another difficult question.
227. The taxable mortgage pool rules limit structures other than the REMIC that can
be used to securitize mortgages, I.R.C. § 7701(i) (2002), presumably to protect the taxation




Over time new securitization structures become entrenched and the costs
of uncertainty decline as lawyers and investors become more familiar and
comfortable with the structure. In addition, the discontinuities between
different areas of the law and between law and accounting rules begin to
erode so that costly impediments to an efficient structure are reduced.
228
Thus, the difficulties that first motivated the FASIT proposals have de-
clined, perhaps to the point that few interested parties would desire a new
statutory regime for securitizations.
On balance, it would be sensible to rationalize the tax treatment of
securitizations by adopting a unified set of rules for all structures. On the
other hand, such a regime would have had much more utility at the time
the FASIT regime was first proposed than it would have now. It is unfor-
tunate that many resources were wasted on a failed approach. Accord-
ingly, while substituting a safe-harbor debt regime for the REMIC and
FASIT rules has great appeal, the repeal of the FASIT provisions would
be an acceptable second-best solution.
V. CONCLUSION
In this piece I argued that the FASIT regime is a failed piece of legisla-
tion that should be replaced or repealed. A taxpayer must incur toll
charges to obtain the tax treatment provided by the regime for asset
securitization transactions. The present value of the toll charge appears
to exceed the value of the benefits bestowed by the FASIT rules, espe-
cially if one takes into account the complexity of the rules, the uncer-
tainty of their application and the additional burdens they place on the
securitization.
Although it has not yet been authoritatively proven, it appears that
asset securitization may reduce transaction costs and help complete mar-
kets. Thus, the activity seems to be economically beneficial. Yet the tax
rules applicable to securitizations have tended to be more complex and
restrictive than economically comparable transactions, such as secured fi-
nancing. This is the insight that motivated the enactment of the REMIC
provisions, which now govern most securitizations of real estate mortgage
loans. It also provoked the attempt to extend the REMIC rules to securi-
tizations of other assets.
To ensure passage, the advocates for extending the REMIC regime
positioned the new legislation as raising revenue. Over time however, it
became clear that protecting the revenue meant adopting unacceptably
complex rules. Ultimately some of the conflict was resolved by adopting
rules that were simple, and protected revenue, but imposed high costs on
those utilizing the regime. Although Congress appeared to delegate re-
sponsibility for reducing those costs to the Treasury Department, it made
doing so in a manner consistent with legislative intent virtually impossi-
ble. Thus, few taxpayers have utilized the regime even though significant
228. For an example of this, see supra notes 115, 124.
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resources were devoted to crafting the statute and developing regulations
interpreting it.
If a proposal to simplify and rationalize the tax rules for securitizations
could have proceeded without revenue considerations, undoubtedly the
end result would not have looked like the FASIT regime. Unfortunately,
the need for revenue combined with the FASIT proponents' strategy
drove a process that destroyed the FASIT as useful tax vehicle.
A more sensible approach would have been to enact a single set of
rules applying to a broad range of securitization transactions. A simple
regime that treated securitizations as secured borrowings and provided
uniform safe-harbor debt classification of interests in securitized assets
would have been a much better way to reduce complexity and improve
the tax treatment of securitizations.
Is it too late now to follow that path? It may well be, and not just
because congressional staff would likely attribute large revenue losses to
such an approach. Those who finance through securitizations have had
years to work around the problems the FASIT regime was supposed to
address. Shifting to a new regime now would impose costs it would not
have imposed in 1995 when the FASIT rules were passed. Those costs
might outweigh the benefits taxpayers could expect to receive from a new
regime, so that there would be no taxpayer constituency for such a
change. Thus, a viable alternative to improving the FASIT rules would
be to simply repeal them and prevent the waste of additional resources
on a failed project.
Ultimately, the FASIT debacle calls into question the role of special
purpose vehicles in the tax law. Examples of this approach include
REMICs, real estate investment trusts and regulated investment compa-
nies. Using a special purpose vehicle to reduce tax costs for economically
desirable transactions glosses over difficult tax policy issues, such as
whether two levels of tax should be imposed on corporate income and
whether income to capital should be subject to tax at all. Resorting to
special purpose vehicles imposes complexity and other costs, hides the tax
policy problems from taxpayers' view, and allows Congress and the Exec-
utive Branch to avoid taking on the problems more broadly.
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